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1077 
Zombie Energy Laws 
Joshua C. Macey* 
This Article traces the development of three legal rules—cost 
recovery for vertically integrated utilities, the requirement that regulators 
assess the financial viability of energy projects before issuing a certificate of 
public convenience and necessity, and the filed rate doctrine—that emerged 
out of the view that electric power companies should be shielded from 
market forces. It argues that important elements of these legal rules have 
become “zombie energy laws.” Zombie energy laws are statutes, regulations, 
and judicial precedents that continue to apply after their underlying 
economic and legal bases dissipate. Zombie energy laws were originally 
designed to protect consumers by, among other things, preventing utilities 
from exploiting their market power. Today, however, they protect incumbent 
fossil fuel generators and have provided the legal basis for invalidating 
billions of dollars of wind and solar projects. Thus, energy laws that 
emerged to mitigate market power abuses under the old system of utility rate 
regulation now entrench incumbent market power and are impeding the 
transition to a cleaner energy system. In this way, zombie energy laws are 
protecting incumbent energy companies from traditional tort, contract, and 
antitrust laws that prevent firms operating in ordinary industries from 
acting anticompetitively.  
This Article concludes by arguing that the Federal Power Act, which 
instructs the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to maintain “just and 
reasonable” wholesale rates, can plausibly be read to mitigate—and, in 
some cases, eliminate—the market distortions caused by zombie energy 
laws. The Act’s meaning should be construed to fit the market structure to 
which it is being applied. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In much of the country, solar and wind generators could provide 
electricity more cost effectively than fossil fuel generators,1 yet solar 
 
 1. See Eric Gimon et al., The Coal Cost Crossover: Economic Viability of Existing Coal 
Compared to Wind and Solar Resources, ENERGY INNOVATION: POL’Y & TECH. LLC 2 (Mar. 2019), 
https://energyinnovation.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Coal-Cost-Crossover_Energy-
Innovation_VCE_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/2WNR-YEWZ]: 
Our research finds that in 2018, 211 gigawatts (GW) of existing (end of 2017) U.S. coal 
capacity, or 74 percent of the national fleet, was at risk from local wind or solar that 
could provide the same amount of electricity more cheaply. By 2025, at-risk coal 
increases to 246 GW – nearly the entire U.S. fleet; 
Levelized Cost of Electricity in the United States, U. TEX. AUSTIN: ENERGY INST., 
http://calculators.energy.utexas.edu/lcoe_map/#/county/tech (last visited May 7, 2020) 
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and wind developments are routinely abandoned because they do not 
receive a “certificate of public convenience and necessity” to build 
transmission lines that would allow them to send power to the grid.2 
Energy markets are vulnerable to market power abuses,3 yet the 
judicially created “filed rate doctrine” largely preempts judicial 
enforcement of state and federal antitrust laws.4 Congress has 
repeatedly taken steps to encourage generators to participate in 
competitive markets,5 yet many utilities that own both transmission 
and generation assets have managed to circumvent competitive 
markets for generations. By selling electricity at a loss and recovering 
these losses in state rate recovery proceedings, vertically integrated 
 
[https://perma.cc/UGM8-GTPQ] (demonstrating the relative cost effectiveness of renewable energy 
sources compared to fossil fuels).  
 2. The Application of Plains and Eastern Clean Line LLC for a Certificate of Public 
Convenience and Necessity to Construct, Own and Operate as an Electric Transmission Public 
Utility in the State of Arkansas, No. 10-041-U, at 1 (Ark. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Jan. 11, 2011), 
http://www.apscservices.info/pdf/10/10-041-u_41_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/6JYA-QRLL]; see Robert 
Walton, Delaware Legislation Aims to Give Leverage over Controversial Artificial Island Project, 
UTILITY DIVE (Jan. 24, 2018), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/delaware-legislation-aims-to-give-
leverage-over-controversial-artificial-is/515483/ [https://perma.cc/3QCK-GUNF] (discussing state-
level plans for clean energy that have received pushback from lawmakers over cost concerns).  
 3. See Severin Borenstein et al., Measuring Market Inefficiencies in California’s 
Restructured Wholesale Electricity Market, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 1376, 1398 (2002) (estimating that 
market power abuses in California transferred approximately $4 billion from consumers to 
generators in 2000); Letter from AARP to Donna N. Kooperstein, Chief, Transp., Energy, and 
Agric. Section, Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice 3 (May 14, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/ 
atr/cases/f259700/259704-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/W9NS-GRV3] (estimating that anticompetitive 
behavior transferred over $100 million from consumers to generators in New York in 2006); see 
also Steven L. Puller, Pricing and Firm Conduct in California’s Deregulated Electricity Market, 89 
REV. ECON. & STAT. 75, 85 (2007) (confirming “earlier work that market power is a concern” when 
“designing deregulated electricity markets”); cf. Frank A. Wolak, Measuring Unilateral Market 
Power in Wholesale Electricity Markets: The California Market, 1998–2000, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 
425, 430 (2003) (noting that “collusive behavior” among California energy generators “is 
unnecessary to explain the enormous increase in market power exercised starting in June 2000”). 
 4. The filed rate doctrine is a common law rule that was extended to utility companies in 
Keogh v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co., 260 U.S. 156, 163 (1922) and prohibits entities that 
are required to file rates and services (also known as “tariffs”) with a regulator from charging rates 
deviating from the terms they filed with regulators. Today, energy companies invoke the filed rate 
doctrine to avoid judicial enforcement of antitrust and bankruptcy regulations. See, e.g., Tex. 
Commercial Energy v. TXU Energy, Inc., 413 F.3d 503, 508–09 (5th Cir. 2005) (“Since Keogh, 
courts have consistently applied the filed rate doctrine in a number of energy cases to preclude 
lawsuits against companies based on rates that were filed with a government agency.” (citation 
omitted)); Wegoland Ltd. v. NYNEX Corp., 27 F.3d 17, 18 (2d Cir. 1994) (“[T]he doctrine holds that 
any ‘filed rate’—that is, one approved by the governing regulatory agency—is per se reasonable 
and unassailable in judicial proceedings brought by ratepayers.”). 
 5. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(a)–(b) (2012) (requiring load-serving entities (“LSEs”) to 
purchase electricity from cogeneration facilities when the facilities can provide electricity cost-
competitively with LSEs). 
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utilities have managed to continue operating coal generators even when 
those generators are uncompetitive.6 
These rules are all vestigial remnants of the public utility era.7 
They originated when most Americans purchased electricity from rate-
regulated, vertically integrated utilities.8 In exchange for exclusive 
franchises, utilities agreed to provide nondiscriminatory electricity at 
regulated rates.9 The filed rate doctrine, the certificate of public 
convenience and necessity, and rate regulation were all intended to 
protect consumers against market power abuses.10 Courts developed 
the filed rate doctrine, for example, to prevent utilities from 
discriminating against certain customers by deviating from the rates 
 
 6. See Catherine Morehouse, Inefficient Coal Plant Scheduling Cost Ratepayers $3.5B from 
2015 to 2017, Report Says, UTILITY DIVE (Oct. 23, 2019), https://www.utilitydive.com/ 
news/inefficient-coal-plant-scheduling-cost-ratepayers-35b-from-2015-to-2017/565648/ [https:// 
perma.cc/QXF8-QC7F] (discussing how “[v]ertically-integrated utilities [have] consistently 
operated coal units based on their own scheduling rather than relying on market signals to 
determine when running that plant would be most economic”); infra Section IV.A. 
 7. This Article is far from the first to observe that statutes can become obsolete. John Hart 
Ely, Guido Calabresi, and others have theorized extensively about the challenges that arise when 
statutes persist beyond their useful life. See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE 
OF STATUTES 8–11 (1982) (discussing “judicial frustration with laws that do not fit the current 
legal landscape and which the courts believe could not be currently enacted”); JOHN HART ELY, 
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 11 (1980) (noting Noah Webster’s 
observation that “the very attempt to make a perpetual constitution, is the assumption of a right 
to control the opinions of future generations; and to legislate for those over whom we have as little 
authority as we have over a nation in Asia”). The description of zombie energy laws is a doctrinal 
contribution that builds on that theoretical literature by identifying the original justification for 
energy laws that are now operating at cross-purposes with environmental goals. More recently, 
Douglas Baird, Anna Gelpern, and Mitu Gulati have explored a related phenomenon in contracts. 
See Douglas G. Baird, Pari Passu Clauses and the Skeuomorph Problem in Contract Law, 67 DUKE 
L.J. ONLINE 84, 86 (2017) (using the word “skeuomorph” to describe contractual terms that remain 
in contracts after losing their original justification); Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Robert E. 
Scott, The Black Hole Problem in Commercial Boilerplate, 67 DUKE L.J. 1, 3 (2017) (discussing how 
boilerplate terms in contract language create “blackholes” over time as they lose meaning but 
remain binding on parties); Anna Gelpern & Mitu Gulati, CDS Zombies, 13 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 
347, 349 (2012) (examining “the role of trade groups in drafting and adjudicating standardised 
contracts” for clues about “how trade group and industry objectives – as distinct from those of the 
parties – might affect contract interpretation”). 
 8. See Jeffrey D. Watkiss & Douglas W. Smith, The Energy Policy Act of 1992—A Watershed 
for Competition in the Wholesale Power Market, 10 YALE J. ON REG. 447, 451 (1993) (“During this 
period, most significant electric utilities were vertically integrated—they generated power, 
transmitted power within their service territory, and distributed power to their retail customers.”); 
infra Part III. 
 9. See New York v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 535 U.S. 1, 5–7 (2002); Jersey Cent. 
Power & Light Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 810 F.2d 1168, 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Starr, 
J., concurring) (“The utility business represents a compact of sorts; a monopoly on service in a 
particular geographical area (coupled with state-conferred rights of eminent domain or 
condemnation) is granted to the utility in exchange for a regime of intensive regulation, including 
price regulation.”); SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & JOSEPH P. TOMAIN, REGULATORY LAW AND POLICY: CASES 
AND MATERIALS 109 (3d ed. 2003). 
 10. See infra Part III. 
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they had “filed” with state and federal regulators.11 The original 
purpose of the certificate of public convenience and necessity was to 
protect the dominant market position of firms who enjoyed a legal right 
to a monopoly.12 Rate regulation kept these monopolists from abusing 
their market power.13 
Beginning in the 1970s, the electricity industry began to shift 
away from cost-of-service regulation as Congress and energy regulators 
broke down barriers to entry.14 But while much of the country has 
embraced competition in energy markets, courts and regulators have 
not abandoned many of the legal rules that emerged to protect 
consumers in the era of utility rate regulation. And they have not done 
so even though the original justification for these rules—that they 
mitigated market power abuses of companies that enjoyed a legal right 
to a monopoly franchise—ceased to exist once regulators decided that 
generation should be subject to market forces.  
Today, these “zombie energy laws” entrench incumbent market 
power and prevent the deployment of renewables.15 The filed rate 
 
 11. See Jim Rossi, Lowering the Filed Tariff Shield: Judicial Enforcement for a Deregulatory 
Era, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1591, 1598–1605 (2003) (“In original design, the [filed rate] doctrine was 
intended to serve as a sword to protect consumers from monopolistic price 
discrimination . . . without justifications based on the cost of providing service to the customer.”). 
 12. See William K. Jones, Origins of the Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity: 
Developments in the States, 1870-1920, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 426, 427 (1979) (“[T]he essence of the 
certificate of public convenience and necessity is the exclusion of otherwise qualified applicants 
from a market because, in the judgment of the regulatory commission, the addition of new or 
expanded services would have no beneficial consequences or . . . [would] have harmful 
consequences.”). 
 13. See 1 A.J. GUSTIN PRIEST, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION: THEORY AND 
APPLICATION 4 (1969) (“This system [of public utility regulation] is designed to protect consumers 
against exploitation where competition is inherently unavailable or inadequate . . . .” (quoting 
Joseph C. Swidler, Comm’r of the Fed. Power Comm’n, Address before the Chicago Law Club (Feb. 
4, 1965))); Darryl Tietjen, An Overview of Rate Regulation in Texas, PUB. UTIL. COMMISSION TEX. 
4, https://pubs.naruc.org/pub.cfm?id=5385E393-2354-D714-5163-60ED2382CB9A [https:// 
perma.cc/5EME-DBV5] (identifying the objective of utility ratemaking as, “[o]n behalf of the 
public, attempt[ing] to replicate the results that would be achieved by competition within the 
context of a monopolistic company operating in a regulated industry”).  
 14. See David B. Spence, Can Law Manage Competitive Electricity Markets?, 93 CORNELL L. 
REV. 765, 770 (2008): 
The impulse to restructure the electric and gas industries had both an economic and a 
political basis. Its economic rationale was part of a sea change in economic thinking in 
the 1970s and 1980s, which saw increased faith in the ability of markets to achieve 
efficient outcomes through competition and reduced faith in the ability of governments 
to achieve efficient outcomes through regulation or production of service. 
 15. Elizabeth Sepper uses a similar phrase to describe organizations that enjoy constitutional 
protections because of a prior religious affiliation that has since faded away. See Elizabeth Sepper, 
Zombie Religious Institutions, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 929, 930–31 (2018) (describing a phenomenon 
where, as a result of ownership changes between secular and religious institutions, a hospital 
remains religious in “zombie form—lacking a live connection to religion but contractually 
committed to religious identity”). 
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doctrine, for example, continues to shield energy companies from civil 
antitrust suits even though most energy companies no longer formally 
file rates with regulators.16 The requirement that regulators assess the 
financial viability of transmission projects before issuing a certificate of 
public convenience and necessity to site new transmission lines is a 
vestigial remnant of a rule that was once needed to prevent new entry 
into a utility’s exclusive service territory.17 In these ways, courts and 
regulators have clung to many of the rules that were created to protect 
customers in the public utility era but have since outlived their useful 
purpose.18 
These zombie energy laws are now seriously degrading energy 
markets. They allow incumbents to raise prices and, worse, prevent 
clean energy companies from competing with incumbent fossil fuel 
generators. For example, Arkansas regulators recently blocked a 
multibillion dollar transmission line that would have enabled more 
than $7 billion of investment in renewable energy facilities after finding 
that only incumbent utilities are eligible to receive a certificate of public 
convenience and necessity in the state of Arkansas.19 Although the 
 
 16. See Rossi, supra note 11, at 1646 (noting how courts have “allow[ed] the filed tariff 
doctrine to become an independent, firm-specific antitrust defense”). In twin cases decided in 1956, 
the Supreme Court instructed the Federal Power Commission (the regulatory predecessor to the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”)) to presume that any freely negotiated 
wholesale transaction was “just and reasonable” for purposes of the Federal Power Act and the 
Natural Gas Act. See Fed. Power Comm’n v. Sierra Pac. Power Co., 350 U.S. 348, 372 (1956) 
(holding that contract rates freely negotiated between sophisticated parties meet the just-and-
reasonable standard required by the Federal Power Act, even if they are unprofitable to the public 
utility); United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Serv. Corp., 350 U.S. 332, 344–45, 347 (1956) 
(same, but for the purposes of the Natural Gas Act). The presumption that freely negotiated energy 
contracts are “just and reasonable” applies even if FERC did not have an initial opportunity to 
review the contract. See NRG Power Mktg., LLC v. Me. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 558 U.S. 165, 167 
(2010) (“Under this Court’s Mobile–Sierra doctrine, FERC must presume that a rate set by ‘a freely 
negotiated wholesale-energy contract’ meets the statutory ‘just and reasonable’ requirement.”); 
Morgan Stanley Capital Grp. Inc. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 554 U.S. 527, 530 (2008) (“The 
presumption may be overcome only if FERC concludes that the contract seriously harms the public 
interest.”).  
 17. This is not always the case. For federal gas pipeline citing, the government is less 
protective of incumbents. See infra Section IV.B. 
 18. As explained in Part IV, much of the country abandoned principles of public utility 
regulation when they “restructured” their energy markets. Restructured electricity markets, also 
known as deregulated electricity markets, refer to parts of the country in which vertically 
integrated utilities no longer own and operate all electricity. Restructured markets permit 
competitors, which are generally known as merchant generators, to enter and exit the market and 
buy and sell electricity. See Regulated vs. Deregulated Energy Markets, ENERGYWATCH, 
https://energywatch-inc.com/regulated-vs-deregulated-electricity-markets/ (last visited May 7, 
2020) [https://perma.cc/M77L-NSGP].  
 19. Estimated costs for Clean Line’s project ranged between approximately $2 and $4 billion. 
See The Application of Plains and Eastern Clean Line LLC for a Certificate of Public Convenience 
and Necessity to Construct, Own and Operate as an Electric Transmission Public Utility in the 
State of Arkansas, No. 10-041-U, at 11–12 (Ark. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Jan. 11, 2011), 
http://www.apscservices.info/pdf/10/10-041-u_41_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/A839-29CL] (denying 
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project would have reduced electricity prices in the southeast and 
provided enough clean energy to power over a million homes a year, it 
has been repeatedly delayed in part because state energy regulators 
have determined that only incumbent utilities were legally authorized 
to construct new transmission lines.20 The certificate of public 
convenience and necessity was originally designed to ensure that rate 
regulated utilities were able to honor their service obligations. Today, 
the requirement that regulators assess market demand before granting 
a certificate of public convenience and necessity entrenches incumbent 
market power and impedes the development of renewable suppliers. 
Numerous scholars and policymakers have questioned the 
usefulness of these doctrines.21 This Article’s contribution is therefore 
not to provide a novel critique of these zombie energy laws. It is instead 
to point out that many of the seemingly diffuse problems that pervade 
modern electric power markets can be attributed to the historical 
origins of electricity regulation. All of these laws emerged to mitigate 
market power abuses under a regulatory system that has largely been 
abandoned. Their continued application is now facilitating market 
power abuses and blocking the development of cleaner and cheaper 
energy sources. 
 
Clean Line’s application to be treated as a public utility); RUSSELL GOLD, SUPERPOWER: ONE MAN’S 
QUEST TO TRANSFORM AMERICAN ENERGY 161–63 (2019) (discussing Clean Line’s struggle to 
obtain a certificate of public convenience and necessity in Arkansas); Robert Walton, DOE 
Terminates Partnership with Clean Line Energy Partners, UTILITY DIVE (Mar. 26, 2018), 
https://www.utilitydive.com/news/doe-terminates-partnership-with-clean-line-energy-
partners/519995/ [https://perma.cc/TP4U-ZTS7] (noting that Clean Line’s project, despite 
construction cost estimates of $2.2 billion, had the potential to “enable over $7 billion of investment 
in new renewable energy facilities in the Oklahoma Panhandle region”); infra Section IV.B. 
 20. See generally GOLD, supra note 19 (tracing the challenges Clean Line Energy faced in its 
attempt to build a power line from Oklahoma to Tennessee that would have spanned seven 
hundred miles); Max Brantley, Arkansas Business: Clean Line Wind Power Project Across 
Arkansas Appears Dead, ARK. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2018), https://arktimes.com/arkansas-
blog/2018/01/23/arkansas-business-clean-line-wind-power-project-across-arkansas-appears-dead 
[https://perma.cc/BF3L-K7Q4] (“Arkansans in Congress want the Energy Department to 
terminate the project. It entered the process when the Clean Line effort couldn’t get state PSC 
approval.”).  
 21. See, e.g., Alexandra B. Klass & Jim Rossi, Reconstituting the Federalism Battle in Energy 
Transportation, 41 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 423, 464–67 (2017) (explaining how transmission line 
siting laws make it difficult for renewable projects to connect to the power grid); Rossi, supra note 
11, at 1597 (“The [filed rate] doctrine also creates perverse incentives for private firms to forum 
shop by strategically over disclosing information to regulators, thus thwarting the ability of both 
regulators and courts to monitor and deter violations of market norms and ultimately causing 
considerable harm to consumers.”); Jeremy Fisher et al., Playing with Other People’s Money: How 
Non-Economic Coal Operations Distort Energy Markets, SIERRA CLUB 4 (Oct. 2019), 
https://www.sierraclub.org/sites/www.sierraclub.org/files/Other%20Peoples%20Money%20Non-
Economic%20Dispatch%20Paper%20Oct%202019.pdf [https://perma.cc/JJR6-XQNJ] (estimating 
that coal generators that participate in competitive markets have used rate regulation to foist $3.5 
billion in unnecessary costs onto captive customers). 
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Moreover, this Article argues that the Federal Power Act 
(“FPA”) can plausibly be interpreted to make it illegal for regulators to 
apply some zombie energy laws in competitive markets when those laws 
serve no useful purpose and allow incumbents to abuse their market 
power. The FPA instructs the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(“FERC”) to make sure that wholesale electricity rates are “just and 
reasonable” and not “unduly discriminatory.”22 Rate regulation of 
vertically integrated utilities, the certificate of public convenience and 
necessity, and the filed rate doctrine may have once protected 
consumers and mitigated market power abuses. Insofar as these zombie 
energy laws have the opposite effect today, they are incompatible with 
FERC’s statutory obligation to maintain “just and reasonable” 
wholesale rates.23 This Article thus argues that the transition to 
competitive power markets renders “unjust and unreasonable” many of 
the very laws and regulations that had supported “just and reasonable” 
wholesale rates when energy markets were rate regulated.24 
I should note at the outset that this Article does not claim that 
rate regulation and the certificate of public convenience and necessity 
should be abandoned altogether.25 Though scholars have defended both 
of those views,26 this Article makes the more modest claim that the 
application of these doctrines in regions that have restructured energy 
markets should evolve to reflect the needs of competitive markets. The 
certificate of public convenience and necessity was originally designed 
to protect incumbents from competition. To the extent that certificate 
of public convenience and necessity laws continue to do so today, they 
contravene the core principles of electricity restructuring. Regulators 
 
 22. 16 U.S.C. § 824e(a) (2012). 
 23. As discussed in Part IV, some form of rate regulation may remain necessary to fund 
transmission projects. While that claim is contested, it is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, 
this Article critiques the ability of generation facilities that are owned by utilities and that operate 
in restructured states to use transmission ratemaking proceedings to avoid having to actually 
compete with merchant generators. 
 24. As discussed in Part V, some zombie energy laws require an administrative or 
congressional response. 
 25. The filed rate doctrine, by contrast, is indefensible and should be jettisoned altogether. 
 26. See, e.g., Harvey Averch & Leland L. Johnson, Behavior of the Firm Under Regulatory 
Constraint, 52 AM. ECON. REV. 1052, 1068 (1962) (“[A] misallocation of economic resources may 
result from the use by regulatory agencies of the rate-of-return constraint for price control.”); 
Ashley C. Brown & Jim Rossi, Siting Transmission Lines in a Changed Milieu: Evolving Notions 
of the “Public Interest” in Balancing State and Regional Considerations, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 705, 
731 (2010) (arguing that state siting laws that focus on in-state benefits are “increasingly 
obsolete”). For important economic work building on their theory, see William J. Baumol & Alvin 
K. Klevorick, Input Choices and Rate-of-Return Regulation: An Overview of the Discussion, 1 BELL 
J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 162 (1970); Alvin K. Klevorick, The Behavior of a Firm Subject to Stochastic 
Regulatory Review, 4 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 57 (1973); Robin A. Prager, Firm Behavior in 
Franchise Monopoly Markets, 21 RAND J. ECON. 211 (1990). 
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should stop assessing whether there is market demand for an energy 
project before authorizing the project.27  
That does not mean, however, that there should be no permitting 
regime for energy infrastructure. There are compelling reasons for 
regulators to review transmission and pipeline projects to make sure 
that they comply with environmental laws, state and federal land use 
laws, and other regulatory programs. But once regulators embrace 
competitive markets, there is no reason for them to continue to assess 
the financial viability of a project before issuing a certificate of public 
convenience or to stipulate that only incumbents can build new energy 
infrastructure.28 Regulators should not be in the business of second-
guessing energy developers’ expectations about the profitability of a 
business venture.  
  Similarly, it is possible that regulators should continue to rate 
regulate transmission projects. Transmission lines possess economies 
of scale that suggest that there are plausible, though not 
incontrovertible, reasons to allow transmission line owners to make 
infrastructure investments and remain confident that they will recover 
their costs.29 But that does not mean that transmission line owners 
should be allowed to use transmission ratemaking proceedings to 
recover losses incurred by generation assets that are supposed to 
operate in competitive markets.30 Nor does it mean that transmission 
developers should be barred from competing with incumbents to build 
new transmission lines in a region.31  
 
 27. See Request for Proposals for New or Upgraded Transmission Line Projects Under Section 
1222 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005, 75 Fed. Reg. 32,940, 32,941 (June 10, 2010) (requiring 
proposed projects to either be “(A) Located in a national interest electric transmission corridor 
designated” and “reduce congestion of electric transmission in interstate commerce; or (B) 
Necessary to accommodate an actual or projected increase in demand for electric transmission 
capacity”). 
 28. FERC has arguably done just that for natural gas pipelines by taking considerable steps 
to ease permitting and deferring to the developer’s views about the financial viability of a project. 
See 18 C.F.R. § 157.5–157.8 (2019). 
 29. That is not to say that there should be no competitive solicitation of transmission lines. 
Once a developer has been designated as responsible for constructing a needed transmission line, 
however, it makes sense to allow the transmission line owner to recover its investment. See, e.g., 
ISO NEW ENGLAND, SECTION II: ISO NEW ENGLAND OPENACCESS TRANSMISSION TARIFF II.2 (Jan. 
22, 2020), https://iso-ne.com/static-assets/documents/regulatory/tariff/sect_2/oatt/sect_ii.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/C4ZK-CNNP] (providing that the “ISO pays to or charges its Market Participants 
or Customers (as applicable) the amounts produced by the pertinent market clearing process or 
through the other pricing mechanisms described in the Tariff”). 
 30. See Fisher et al., supra note 21, at 20 (noting that “[w]hile merchant [generators] must 
recover all of their costs through energy and capacity markets,” regulated generators can recover 
costs through “fuel adjustment proceedings” where “utilities report the incurred cost of fuel, and 
request adjustments to rates”). 
 31. I should also note that zombie energy laws are not the exclusive, or even the predominant, 
reason that energy markets continue to favor incumbents and remain vulnerable to market power 
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This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I explains why the 
electricity industry was excepted from market forces. It summarizes the 
conventional view that regulators gave utilities exclusive franchises 
because they believed that utilities were natural monopolies. In 
addition, it explains that utility regulation may have also been the 
result of regulatory capture and attempts to circumvent the Lochner 
era’s substantive due process jurisprudence. Part II describes how 
competition was introduced into electricity markets beginning in the 
1970s. Part III identifies the theoretical rationales of the filed rate 
doctrine, the certificate of public convenience and necessity, and rate 
regulation. These laws were originally designed to protect consumers 
from market power abuses by companies that enjoyed a legal right to a 
monopoly. Part IV shows how these zombie energy laws now protect 
incumbents and impose barriers to entry for clean energy companies. 
They do so, moreover, despite the fact that regulators have abandoned 
the economic and legal justifications that originally motivated these 
doctrines. Part V concludes by offering suggestions about how to most 
efficiently transition away from these zombie energy laws and argues 
that many of the most objectionable zombie energy laws may violate the 
FPA.  
I. UTILITY REGULATION  
The conventional view is that regulators exempted a significant 
percentage of the American economy from market pressures between 
 
abuses. There are many reasons why restructured power markets are not fully competitive. These 
challenges have been documented extensively. See Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth J. Wilson, 
Interstate Transmission Challenges for Renewable Energy: A Federalism Mismatch, 65 VAND. L. 
REV. 1801, 1827, 1829–30 (2012) (critiquing state-centered electric transmission line siting 
regimes as being ill-equipped to accommodate the regional and national scope of the electric grid); 
Alexandra B. Klass, The Electric Grid at a Crossroads: A Regional Approach to Siting 
Transmission Lines, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1895, 1898–1901 (2015) [hereinafter Klass, The Electric 
Grid at a Crossroads] (“[A] regional approach rather than a purely federal approach is a better 
match for the physical and market characteristics of the grid as well as modern policy preferences 
regarding future electricity resources.”); Alexandra B. Klass, Takings and Transmission, 91 N.C. 
L. REV. 1079, 1152–54 (2013) [hereinafter Klass, Takings and Transmission] (critiquing state 
eminent domain laws for failing to consider renewable policy goals); Joshua C. Macey & Jackson 
Salovaara, Bankruptcy as Bailout: Coal Company Insolvency and the Erosion of Federal Law, 71 
STAN. L. REV. 879, 906–42 (2019) (describing how coal companies have reorganized in a manner 
that has allowed them to avoid internalizing many regulatory costs); Jim Rossi, The Trojan Horse 
of Electric Power Transmission Line Siting Authority, 39 ENVTL. L. 1015, 1018–19 (2009) 
(contending that the problem of cost allocation in transmission line expansion is a bigger problem 
than restrictive state siting laws); Shelley Welton, Rethinking Grid Governance for the Climate 
Change Era, CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=3564682&dgcid=ejournal_htmlemail_energy:law:policy:ejournal_abstractlink [https:// 
perma.cc/DQK8-LAE6] (arguing that regional transmission organization (“RTO”) governance 
procedures are protecting incumbent fossil fuel generators). Eliminating energy laws that have 
outlived their useful purpose would eliminate only some of these constraints. 
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1880 and 1920 because they believed that these industries were natural 
monopolies.32 Alternative explanations are that the utility industries 
managed to capture their regulators and convince them to accept a 
regulatory apparatus that was highly favorable to incumbent power 
providers, and that public utility regulation reflected a strategic 
decision by state legislatures to circumvent restrictions the Lochner 
Court imposed on regulations that interfered with private property. 
This Part summarizes these views and presents evidence that the rise 
in public utility regulation was likely due to a combination of all three.  
A. Utilities as Natural Monopolies 
A natural monopoly exists when it is efficient for a single firm to 
control an entire market.33 The term natural monopoly does not refer to 
the number of companies that happen to operate at a given moment in 
time, but to a market in which “the entire demand . . . can be satisfied 
at lowest cost by one firm rather than by two or more.”34  
Natural monopolies are characterized by declining average costs 
and often describe industries with high fixed costs. If a single set of 
railroad tracks is capable of transporting everyone who wants to travel 
from Boston to New York by rail, then it imposes needless costs to build 
a second set of railroad tracks. A company that decides to do so is 
making unnecessary capital investments. A single set of tracks could 
meet all of the demand for rail service between Boston and New York. 
 
 32. Herbert Hovenkamp, Technology, Politics, and Regulated Monopoly: An American 
Historical Perspective, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1263, 1268 (1984) (“The proliferation of such monopolies 
was justified at that time by the precapitalist economic view that in certain markets with high 
start-up costs no private entrepreneur would invest his money unless he was guaranteed freedom 
from competitive entry.”). Justice Story seemingly embraced this position in his dissenting opinion 
in Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. 420, 608 (1837). Story claimed that failure to 
provide monopoly protection in high-investment industries would “arrest all public 
improvements.” Charles River Bridge, 36 U.S. at 606. A related view held that this approach 
facilitated capital formation. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW: 
1780-1860, at 109–39 (1977) (“In an under developed society, with little available private capital, 
a policy of encouraging development required that the legal system provide legal arrangements 
that guaranteed private investors certainty and predictability of economic consequences. Perhaps 
the most important of these guarantees was protection against freedom from competitive injury.”). 
 33. See Richard A. Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REV. 548, 548 
(1969) (“If the entire demand within a relevant market can be satisfied at lowest cost by one firm 
rather than by two or more, the market is a natural monopoly . . . .”). It is worth noting that the 
market need not be nationwide. If there are locational barriers that prevent companies located far 
apart from competing with each other, it is possible to have multiple natural monopolies and to 
give exclusive franchises to distinct regions. People who want to travel by rail from Boston to 
Washington, D.C. do not compete with people who want to travel from Los Angeles to San 
Francisco. See id. at 574 (“Generally it is the regional or local market that can accommodate only 
a single firm.”). 
 34. Id.  
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Historically, many segments of the energy industry possessed 
significant economies of scale. Although it was costly to build the 
transmission lines that transport electricity, once a company built a 
transmission line, it was often able to provide electricity to an entire 
community.35 An incumbent that had already built a transmission line 
was thus in a position to offer less expensive electricity to new users 
than its competitors.36 While a new entrant would have to invest in a 
transmission system before providing electricity to a new community, 
the incumbent would have to pay only for the additional electricity 
because it had already built the infrastructure necessary to transport 
electricity from power generators to new homes. The same economies of 
scale apply to gas pipelines. Moreover, at its inception, the electric 
power generation industry also possessed economies of scale because 
larger generators produced electricity more efficiently than smaller 
ones. Many policymakers therefore felt that electricity in a region could 
be provided and transported most efficiently by a single firm. As a 
result, they viewed the industry as a natural monopoly.37 
The decision to protect utilities from market forces was in large 
part based on this view that energy companies were natural 
monopolies. It is a view often associated with Samuel Insull, who wrote 
in 1898 that electric power companies would provide more efficient 
service if “exclusive control of a given territory [were] placed in the 
hands of one undertaking.”38 According to Insull, it was cost effective 
for a single firm to dominate its market.39 Insull therefore urged state 
legislatures to give electric power companies exclusive franchises. 
Recognizing that monopolists can exploit their market power, however, 
Insull proposed that “exclusive franchises . . . be coupled with the 
conditions of public control, requiring all charges for services fixed by 
 
 35. See PAUL L. JOSKOW & RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, MARKETS FOR POWER: AN ANALYSIS OF 
ELECTRIC UTILITY DEREGULATION 59 (1983): 
[A]s the number of customers on the network or the total power demand on the network 
increases, given a particular geographic area served by the distribution system, unit 
distribution costs can be expected to decline. These apparently pervasive economies of 
density imply that it would be inefficient to serve the same geographic area with more 
than one distribution system. 
 36. See id. 
 37. Technological advances increased the efficiency of small gas wellheads and electricity 
generators and, in doing so, eroded the economic justification for natural monopoly regulation. See 
Richard J. Pierce, Reconsidering the Roles of Regulation and Competition in the Natural Gas 
Industry, 97 HARV. L. REV. 345, 357–63 (1983). 
 38. SAMUEL INSULL, CENTRAL-STATION ELECTRIC SERVICE 45 (William E. Keily ed., 1915). 
 39. Id. A natural monopoly refers to an industry in which a single firm can produce a good or 
service more cost effectively than it would if it faced competition. Natural monopolies are generally 
characterized by declining average costs. WILLIAM W. SHARKEY, THE THEORY OF NATURAL 
MONOPOLY 4 (1982). 
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public bodies to be based on cost plus a reasonable profit.”40 To prevent 
market power abuses, utilities would be required to serve all customers 
on a nondiscriminatory basis and at regulated rates.41  
Insull’s argument about optimal electricity regulation was 
quickly adopted by Progressive Era policymakers. Twenty years after 
Insull’s speech, a majority of states regulated the electric power 
industry according to natural monopoly principles.42 In exchange for the 
exclusive right to serve a geographic area, electricity companies 
submitted to pervasive regulatory oversight.43 State public service 
commissions prescribed maximum rates and required companies to 
provide nondiscriminatory access to electricity. 
And the natural monopoly story does seem to have influenced 
policymakers that regulated public utilities. In 1908, for example, the 
Massachusetts Railroad Commission explained that the state’s 
electricity “statutes are founded on the assumption that, to have two or 
more competing companies running lines of gas pipe and conduits for 
electric wires through the same street would often greatly increase the 
necessary cost of furnishing light.”44 Other public utility commissioners 
regularly echoed this concern,45 and their views found support in 
academic arguments.46 Thus, one of the reasons policymakers subjected 
electric power companies to rate regulation and gave them exclusive 
franchises was because they believed that the industry was a natural 
monopoly and that it was therefore economically efficient to do so. 
B. Regulatory Capture  
Legal and economic historians have not, however, unanimously 
endorsed the view that cost-of-service regulation followed from the 
theory that the utility industries were natural monopolies. Scholars 
have also suggested that public utility regulation reflected regulators’ 
 
 40. INSULL, supra note 38, at 45. 
 41. Id. Discriminatory service refers to pricing policies that treated certain customers more 
favorably than others. Regulators prohibited discriminatory service to prevent utilities from giving 
favorable terms to certain customers and to prohibit them from refusing to serve others. 
 42. See Jones, supra note 12, at 447–50 (tabulating the origins of state public service 
commissions). 
 43. See Spence, supra note 14, at 767–68 (“[G]overnments licensed private firms as monopoly 
suppliers, closely regulating their rates and conditions of service.”). 
 44. Weld v. Gas & Elec. Light Comm’rs, 84 N.E. 101, 101–02 (Mass. 1908); see also CHARLES 
F. PHILLIPS, JR., THE REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES 4 (1993) (“Public utilities . . . seem to 
operate more efficiently as monopolies.”). 
 45. See infra Sections III.A, III.B. 
 46. See YOUNG B. SMITH, NOEL T. DOWLING & ROBERT L. HALE, CASES ON THE LAW OF PUBLIC 
UTILITIES 1–6 (Warren A. Seavey ed., 2d ed. 1936) (summarizing the history and theory behind 
public utilities and their regulation). 
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attempts to support the industries that had managed to curry favor 
with energy regulators.47  
There is evidence that the capture theory accounts for at least 
part of the sudden rise of utility rate regulation. Utility regulation was 
immensely profitable for the energy companies that managed to use it 
to shield themselves from competition, and prominent public service 
commissioners worked for the industries they regulated before and 
after becoming commissioners.48 Insull himself stood to benefit if 
regulators accepted his economic argument because doing so would 
have the convenient effect of shielding his electricity franchises from 
competition.  
It is perhaps unsurprising, therefore, that energy companies 
such as those operated by Insull would lobby for public utility 
regulation. When a regulator or legislature designated a business a 
public utility, the business would generally be shielded from 
competition and enjoy a protected stream of revenue. From the 
perspective of utilities, it was clearly preferable to have a captive 
customer base than to be forced to compete with other railroad and 
energy companies. 
The capture theory is not inconsistent with the natural 
monopoly theory. Even if one believes that regulatory capture accounts 
entirely for the sudden rise in utility regulation, policymakers 
nonetheless justified utility rate regulation on the theory that public 
utilities were natural monopolies—even if that justification was 
entirely pretextual.49 In fact, prominent adherents to the capture theory 
have recognized that regulators relied on the natural monopoly theory 
to defend their decisions to give railroad, electricity, gas, and 
telecommunications companies exclusive franchises.50  
C. Lochner Evasion 
There is also evidence that utility rate regulation offered a way 
for regulators to impose substantive regulations that otherwise would 
 
 47. See George L. Priest, The Origins of Public Utility Regulation and the “Theories of 
Regulation” Debate, 36 J.L. & ECON. 289, 291–94 (1993) (describing critiques of utility regulation 
advanced in the second half of the twentieth century). 
 48. See id. at 299–305 (“[F]indings that profits were higher under regulation suggested that 
regulatory commissions were created as a result of industry demand rather than to pursue the 
public interest.”). 
 49. See id. (“Demsetz intimated that the natural monopoly defense for regulation may well 
be a pretext disguising a regulatory regime that benefited and, therefore, might be demanded by 
the regulated monopolists themselves.”). 
 50. See 1 ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS 
15–39 (1970) (summarizing scholarly views). 
3_Macey (Do Not Delete) 5/22/2020  6:55 PM 
2020] ZOMBIE ENERGY LAWS 1091 
have run afoul of the Lochner Court’s protection of corporate property 
rights. Public utilities were given exclusive franchises just as the 
Supreme Court embraced a strong view of private property in what is 
now known as the Lochner era.  
The Lochner era is remembered today for the Supreme Court’s 
willingness to strike down regulations that interfered with private 
contract.51 While scholars disagree about the Lochner Court’s 
motivations—some view Lochner and its progeny as constitutionalizing 
laissez-faire market principles,52 others view them as associating early 
twentieth-century American capitalism with natural rights, and others 
view them as rejecting “class” legislation by preventing legislatures 
from passing laws that allowed certain groups “to gain unfair or 
unnatural advantages over their market adversaries”53—all of these 
theories accept that the Lochner Court was willing to invoke liberty of 
contract to strike down economic regulations. The legal environment in 
which utility law developed was thus one in which it was difficult for 
legislatures to regulate rates and services. And when energy regulators 
wanted to control utilities’ rates and services, they often encountered 
judicial skepticism.54 
 
 51. See Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 874 (1987) (“The received 
wisdom is that Lochner was wrong because it involved ‘judicial activism’: an illegitimate intrusion 
by the courts into a realm properly reserved to the political branches of government.”); see also 
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905) (striking down a ten-hour workday limit as 
“interfer[ing] with the right of contract between the employer and employees”). 
 52. See, e.g., Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 
691 (1999) (Scalia, J.) (“We had always thought that the distinctive feature of Lochner, nicely 
captured in Justice Holmes’s dissenting remark about ‘Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics,’ was 
that it sought to impose a particular economic philosophy upon the Constitution.” (citation 
omitted)).  
 53. HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER 
ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 11, 61 (1993). 
 54. See Klatt v. R.R. Comm’n, 221 P. 926, 931 (Cal. 1923) (annulling the order of the Railroad 
Commission finding a public utility because “the record is destitute of any evidence which even 
tends to show an unequivocal intention or conduct . . . from which a dedication of the water to a 
public use can be inferred”); Richardson v. R.R. Comm’n, 218 P. 418, 420–21 (Cal. 1923) (annulling 
the Railroad Commission’s decision and order declaring the petitioner a public utility, explaining 
that “we utterly fail to find any substantial evidence that this petitioner” should be considered “a 
public utility subject to regulation as to its service and rates by the Railroad Commission”); 
Stratton v. R.R. Comm’n, 198 P. 1051, 1053–54 (Cal. 1921) (prohibiting rate regulation of a water 
company that was not dedicated to a “public use”); Allen v. R.R. Comm’n, 175 P. 466, 467–68 (Cal. 
1918) (stating that “[t]o hold that property has been dedicated to a public use is ‘not a trivial thing,’ 
and such dedication is never presumed ‘without evidence of unequivocal intention’ ” (quoting San 
Francisco v. Grote, 52 P. 127, 128 (Cal. 1898))); Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Eshleman, 137 P. 1119, 
1127–28 (Cal. 1913) (explaining the three circumstances in which public utility commissions have 
legal authority to regulate utility rates and services); Thayer v. Cal. Dev. Co., 128 P. 21, 24 (Cal. 
1912) (“[T]he water right which a person gains by diversion from a stream for a beneficial use is a 
private right—a right subject to ownership and disposition by him, as in the case of other private 
property.”); Hildreth v. Montecito Creek Water Co., 72 P. 395, 396, 398 (Cal. 1903) (finding that, 
because a water company was not dedicated to a public use, it could not be compelled to provide 
3_Macey (Do Not Delete) 5/22/2020  6:55 PM 
1092 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:4:1077 
The particular regulatory structure that came to dominate the 
energy industry in the early twentieth century, in which energy 
companies with exclusive franchises agreed to cap rates and provide 
nondiscriminatory service to all customers in their service areas, 
allowed state legislatures to regulate energy contracts without falling 
afoul of the Supreme Court’s substantive due process jurisprudence. 
That is because while the Supreme Court was skeptical of legislative 
interventions that interfered with private property, the Court was more 
accommodating of regulations that interfered with utilities’ property. In 
Munn v. Illinois, a decision that predated Lochner, the Supreme Court 
held that the legislature could cap rates and regulate services of 
companies in certain circumstances.55 Specifically, Munn held that 
property ceased to be “purely and exclusively private”56 when it was 
“affected with a public interest.”57 A company became “clothed with a 
public interest” and therefore subject to regulatory control when it 
enjoyed a legal right to a monopoly or was a “common carrier.”58  
The Lochner Court did not reject Munn’s holding that states 
could regulate firms that were “affected with a public interest.”59 Some 
states seem to have viewed utility rate regulation as allowing them to 
 
continued service to a customer); Niles v. City of Los Angeles, 58 P. 190, 192 (Cal. 1899) (stating 
that a company will not be regarded as a public utility “without evidence of unequivocal 
intention”). State utility regulators also routinely considered the legal and economic consequences 
of decisions to authorize market entry when adjudicating disputes involving utility companies. See 
Coast Ctys. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Sierra & S.F. Power Co., P.U.R. 1917C. 709 (Cal. R.R. Comm’n 1917) 
(permitting an electric company to serve a large customer on the ground that doing so would not 
lead to duplicative transmission lines); Great W. Power Co., 8 Cal. R.R. Comm’n 426 (1915) 
(expressing concern that market entry would expose incumbent utilities to losses by removing 
large segments of their business); Great W. Power Co., P.U.R. 1915E 843 (Cal. R.R. Comm’n 1915) 
(same); Oro Elec. Corp., 2 Cal. R.R. Comm’n 748 (1913) (stating that the Commission would assess 
the financial viability of potential market participants in order to ensure that utilities would be 
able to honor their service obligations), aff’d, 147 P. 118, (1915); Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Great W. 
Power Co., 1 Cal. R.R. Comm’n 203 (1912) (stating that the law is designed to protect a utility 
where that utility “has pioneered in the field, and is rendering efficient and cheap service and is 
fulfilling adequately the duty which, as a public utility, it owes to the public, and the territory is 
so generally served that it may be said to have reached the point of saturation”). 
 55. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876). 
 56. Id. at 125. 
 57. Id. at 126.   
 58. Id. at 130–33, 151–52. A common carrier is a company that is “bound” to “serve all persons 
to the capacity of his facilities, without discrimination, and for reasonable pay.” Mich. Pub. Util. 
Comm’n v. Duke, 266 U.S. 570, 577 (1925); see also Sanger v. Lukens, 24 F.2d 226, 228 (D. Idaho 
1927) (defining a common carrier as one who “holds himself out to the public and transports upon 
the highways for compensation all property for any one”). 
 59. See, e.g., New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 304 (1932): 
To grant any monopoly to any person as a favor is forbidden even if terminable. But 
where, as here, there is reasonable ground for the legislative conclusion that in order to 
secure a necessary service at reasonable rates, it may be necessary to curtail the right 
to enter the calling, it is, in my opinion, consistent with the due process clause to do 
so . . . . 
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regulate rates and services in a manner that would pass the Supreme 
Court’s strong conception of property rights. The California Supreme 
Court, for example, said that the state’s “primary purpose” in enacting 
public utility regulations was to “give into the power of the Commission 
for regulation and control in the interest of the public the operation of 
auto stages for transportation.”60 By granting public utilities legally 
protected monopoly franchises and conditioning their right to operate 
in a given market on companies’ willingness to hold themselves out to 
the public, state regulators managed to ensure that public utilities were 
“clothed with the public interest” and therefore subject to regulatory 
control. 
Public utilities thus enjoyed extremely favorable market 
conditions. They enjoyed a legal right to operate free from competition. 
In exchange, they agreed to cap rates and provide nondiscriminatory 
service to everyone in their service territories. This regulatory structure 
seems to have had at least three causes. First, policymakers believed 
that utilities were natural monopolies and therefore that it was 
economically desirable for a single firm to control an entire market. 
Second, industry succeeded in capturing its regulators. Third, state 
legislatures recognized that utility regulation offered a way for them to 
regulate corporate property despite Lochner-era restrictions. 
II. RESTRUCTURING 
In most of the country today,61 electric power generators no 
longer enjoy exclusive franchises.62 In the 1970s, policymakers 
abandoned the economic theory that utilities needed to be protected 
from competition and began a lengthy process of restructuring the 
airline, energy, and telecommunications businesses to introduce 
competitive pressures into those industries.63 Restructuring the electric 
 
 60. Motor Transit Co. v. R.R. Comm’n, 209 P. 586, 591 (Cal. 1922); see also Palermo Land & 
Water Co. v. Cal. R.R. Comm’n, 160 P. 228, 230 (Cal. 1916) (explaining that the state’s “grant of a 
water right” constituted “a burden or servitude upon the water system of the grantor”). 
 61. About one-third of the country continues to receive power from vertically integrated 
utilities that are subject to rate regulation. Moreover, while two-thirds of the country has 
introduced competition into electric power markets, there are significant differences among 
restructured states, and some retain many of the hallmarks of the public utility model. See Map 
of Deregulated Energy States and Markets, ELECTRIC CHOICE, https://www.electricchoice.com/map-
deregulated-energy-markets/ (last updated 2018) [https://perma.cc/LVE9-U8QF]. 
 62. See Jim Rossi, The Electric Deregulation Fiasco: Looking to Regulatory Federalism to 
Promote a Balance Between Markets and the Provision of Public Goods, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1768, 
1772–78 (2002) (summarizing the deregulatory movement and explaining how that movement 
supported policy choices that led to restructuring). 
 63. See generally Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of 
Regulated Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323 (1998) (describing the legal, academic, and 
technical causes of deregulation across a number of different utility industries). 
3_Macey (Do Not Delete) 5/22/2020  6:55 PM 
1094 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:4:1077 
power industry began with the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act 
(“PURPA”)64 and has continued ever since.65  
A core insight that led to deregulation of the sale of electric 
power was that power generation—the process of producing and selling 
electricity—could be unbundled from the transmission services that 
deliver electricity to end users. As a result of technological 
developments in the middle of the twentieth century, smaller gas-fired 
power plants became cost competitive with the generation facilities that 
had provided electricity to the United States during the first half of the 
century.66 
Legal reform followed. Congress passed PURPA in 1978.67 
PURPA required vertically integrated utilities to purchase power from 
merchant power plants, known as qualifying facilities, and allow those 
facilities to connect to the grid.68 Utilities were required to purchase 
power from qualifying utilities at the utilities’ avoided cost, which 
referred to the amount it would have cost the utility to generate an 
equivalent amount of power itself.69 
PURPA demonstrated that it was possible for utilities to 
purchase power from independent generators and thus that power 
generation could be exposed to competitive forces. Legal reforms in the 
1990s built on that realization. First, the Energy Policy Act of 1992 
increased the number of merchant generation facilities that were 
permitted to generate electric power and sell that power to distribution 
facilities.70 It also gave FERC authority to require that utilities provide 
 
 64. Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, 16 U.S.C. § 2601 (2012). 
 65. A number of factors led American regulators to embrace markets in electric power. These 
included an academic embrace of market forces, a recognition that power generation could be 
unbundled from transmission, a concern about the incentive that regulated utilities had to keep 
their costs high in order to maximize the rate base from which regulators calculated costs, and a 
concern that regulated utilities had more information about their costs and operations than did 
regulators. See Spence, supra note 14, at 770–72 (“To its critics, a system with high transaction 
costs, information asymmetries, and perverse incentives will yield unnecessarily high electric 
rates in both wholesale and retail markets.”).  
 66. See Severin Borenstein & James Bushnell, The U.S. Electricity Industry After 20 Years of 
Restructuring, 7 ANN. REV. ECON. 437, 439, 441–43 (2015) (describing how the development of 
small generators challenged the theory that generation was a natural monopoly). 
 67. Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (1978) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 16, 42, and 43 U.S.C.). 
 68. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3 (2012). 
 69. Id. 
 70. See Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, § 722, 106 Stat. 2776, 2916 (codified 
at 16 U.S.C. § 824k (2012)) (amending section 212 of the Federal Power Act):  
An order under section 211 shall require the transmitting utility subject to the order to 
provide wholesale transmission services at rates, charges, terms, and conditions which 
permit the recovery by such utility of all the costs incurred in connection with the 
transmission services and necessary associated services, including, but not limited to, 
an appropriate share, if any, of legitimate, verifiable and economic costs, including 
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open and nondiscriminatory access to transmission services.71 The 
independent power producers (“IPPs”) that entered electricity markets 
were not rate regulated. 
FERC then issued three orders: Order 888, Order 889, and Order 
1000, to further encourage competition in electric power markets. 
Utilities were ordered to “functionally unbundle” generation from 
transmission,72 to provide independent power producers with real-time 
pricing information,73 and to encourage the formation of independent 
system operators (“ISOs”) to manage day-to-day grid operations.74 
Today, ISOs operate electric power markets across much of the grid.75 
 
taking into account any benefits to the transmission system of providing the 
transmission service, and the costs of any enlargement of transmission facilities. Such 
rates, charges, terms, and conditions shall promote the economically efficient 
transmission and generation of electricity and shall be just and reasonable, and not 
unduly discriminatory or preferential. Rates, charges, terms, and conditions for 
transmission services provided pursuant to an order under section 211 shall ensure 
that, to the extent practicable, costs incurred in providing the wholesale transmission 
services, and properly allocable to the provision of such services, are recovered from the 
applicant for such order and not from a transmitting utility’s existing wholesale, retail, 
and transmission customers; 
see also § 711, 106 Stat. at 2905–10 (repealed 2005) (amending section 32 of the Public Utility 
Holding Company Act of 1935 to expand the category of firms that could sell electricity at 
wholesale). 
 71. See § 721, 106 Stat at 2915–16 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 824j (2012)), which amended 
section 211 of the FPA such that:  
Any electric utility, Federal power marketing agency, or any other person generating 
electric energy for sale for resale, may apply to the Commission for an order under this 
subsection requiring a transmitting utility to provide transmission services (including 
any enlargement of transmission capacity necessary to provide such services) to the 
applicant. 
 72. See Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory 
Transmission Services by Public Utilities, Order No. 888, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540, 21,577 (May 10, 
1996) (“Our approach to assuring such open access . . . [requires] [f]unctional unbundling of 
transmission and generation (which includes separately stated rates for generation, transmission, 
and ancillary services, and a requirement that a transmission provider take service under its own 
tariff), except for bundled retail service . . . .”). As discussed in Part IV, FERC allowed “functional” 
separation of transmission and generation and did not require utilities to divest or spin off their 
transmission assets. See id. at 21,552 (“In the absence of evidence that functional unbundling will 
not work, we are not prepared to adopt a more intrusive and potentially more costly mechanism—
corporate unbundling—at this time.”). 
 73. See Open Access Same-Time Information System (Formerly Real-Time Information 
Networks) and Standards of Conduct, Order No. 889, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,737, 21,740 (May 10, 1996) 
(“This final rule contains three basic provisions that, taken together, will ensure that transmission 
customers have access to transmission information enabling them to obtain open access 
transmission service on a non-discriminatory basis.”). 
 74. See Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory 
Transmission Services by Public Utilities, Order No. 888, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540, 21,552 (May 10, 
1996) (“[W]e see many benefits in ISOs, and encourage utilities to consider ISOs as a tool to meet 
the demands of the competitive marketplace.”). 
 75. See Regional Transmission Operators (RTO)/Independent System Operators (ISO), FED. 
ENERGY REG. COMMISSION, https://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/rto.asp (last 
updated Dec. 20, 2019) [https://perma.cc/FY7B-T74Q]. 
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They manage a bidding process that selects the least expensive 
generators that are available to provide the electricity the grid needs at 
a given moment.76 They also oversee grid planning.77 In these markets, 
load-serving entities (“LSEs”), which distribute electricity to end users, 
are required to purchase electricity in auctions overseen by grid 
operators.78 Energy market auctions are supposed to ensure that 
market forces replace competition as the mechanism for determining 
which generators operate in a given moment. But as Part IV shows, 
zombie energy laws are undermining this goal. 
III. LAWS FOR RATE-REGULATED UTILITIES  
Although the electric power industry has evolved and much of 
the country no longer shields power generators from competition, many 
of the legal rules that originated in the public utility era persist despite 
the fact that those rules were designed to mitigate the particular 
challenges posed by cost-of-service regulation. Regulators developed a 
number of doctrines to preserve utilities’ exclusive franchises and 
ensure that they were able to honor their service obligations. This Part 
traces the origins of these laws and describes the original justifications 
for three such doctrines—rate regulation for vertically integrated 
utilities, the certificate of public convenience and necessity, and the 
filed rate doctrine. Part IV argues that these three legal rules have 
become zombie energy laws: they have outlived their useful purpose, 
are seriously distorting electricity markets in areas of the country that 
 
 76. For a description of this bidding process, see infra Section IV.A. 
 77. See RALPH LUCIANI & MAGGIE SHOBER, NAT’L ASS’N REG. UTIL. COMMISSIONERS, 
TRANSMISSION PLANNING WHITE PAPER 9 (Jan. 2014), https://pubs.naruc.org/ 
pub.cfm?id=53A151F2-2354-D714-519F-53E0785A966A [https://perma.cc/62WW-ZPHA] (“RTOs 
do not own transmission facilities. They operate the transmission system in accordance with 
NERC and regional reliability criteria on behalf of their member transmission owners, administer 
the regional OATT, ensure nondiscriminatory access to the transmission system, and manage and 
plan for the reliability of the transmission system.”); Jay Caspary, Electric Transmission 101: 
Markets, ISOs/RTOs and Grid Planning/Operations, ENVTL. & ENERGY STUDY INST. 10 
https://www.eesi.org/files/070913_Jay_Caspary.pdf (last visited May 7, 2020) [https://perma.cc/ 
GY66-N5VC] (explaining that ISOs “[p]erform planning and operations of the grid to ensure 
reliability”); Regional Transmission Operators (RTO)/Independent System Operators (ISO), supra 
note 75. 
 78. See Reliability Assurance Agreement Among Load Serving Entities in the PJM Region, 
PJM INTERCONNECTION 41 (Sept. 17, 2010) https://www.pjm.com/directory/merged-tariffs/raa.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/PPU6-E5D8] (“Except to the extent its capacity obligations are satisfied through 
the FRR Alternative, each Party shall pay, as to the loads it serves in each Zone during a Delivery 
Year, a Locational Reliability Charge for each such Zone during such Delivery Year.”); 
Understanding the Differences Between PJM’s Markets, PJM INTERCONNECTION 1 (Mar. 6, 2019) 
https://learn.pjm.com/-/media/about-pjm/newsroom/fact-sheets/understanding-the-difference-
between-pjms-markets-fact-sheet.ashx? [https://perma.cc/2HNC-PDMS] (“Each year, PJM holds a 
competitive auction to obtain these future power supplies at the lowest reasonable price.”). 
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have abandoned the public utility model for generations, and are 
impeding the transition to a cleaner energy sector. 
A. Origins of Rate Regulation 
Price regulation was the bedrock principle of public utility 
regulation and seems to have been relatively uncontroversial in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. By 1932, three companies—
the Electric Bond and Share Company, J.P. Morgan’s United Company, 
and the Insull Group—controlled nearly half of the investor-owned 
utilities that operated in the United States.79  
Large utility companies took advantage of their dominant 
market position in a number of ways.80 In response to what President 
Roosevelt described as the “none too benevolent private paternalism” 
and “tyrannical power and exclusive opportunity” of these utilities, the 
federal government implemented a number of reforms designed to 
mitigate market power abuses.81 
Whether because policymakers believed that it was economically 
optimal for utilities to enjoy monopoly control over the markets in which 
they operated or because they regarded it as a more practical response 
to the legal and political realities of the 1920s and 1930s, the energy 
regulators decided to regulate—not break up—energy utilities.82  
Once policymakers decided to treat energy companies as public 
utilities and grant them exclusive franchises, they had to figure out how 
to mitigate market power abuses of the utility companies that enjoyed 
a legal right to a monopoly. Absent regulatory interference, a 
monopolist will produce lower quality goods at a higher price than it 
would in competitive markets.83 The monopolist will in this way capture 
surplus that would otherwise go to consumers.84 
 
 79. See Douglas W. Hawes & William S. Lamb, Restructuring Under PUHCA: Can the ‘35 Act 
Envelope Be Stretched?, 3 ELECTRICITY J. 16, 18 (1990) (“By 1932, approximately 49% of the 
[investor-owned utilities] were controlled by three holding companies.”). 
 80. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, UTILITY CORPORATIONS, S. DOC. NO. 70-92, Pt. 73-A (1st Sess. 
1935) (summary report on the holding and operating companies of electric and gas utilities).  
 81. FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, PRESIDENT OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE NATIONAL POWER 
POLICY COMMITTEE WITH RESPECT TO THE TREATMENT OF HOLDING COMPANIES, H.R. DOC. NO. 74-
137, at 2–3, 8 (1st Sess. 1935). 
 82. See Watkiss & Smith, supra note 8, at 451 (“The structural requirements of PUHCA and 
the jurisdictional provisions of the FPA remained essentially unchanged from 1935 to 1978. During 
this period, most significant electric utilities were vertically integrated—they generated power, 
transmitted power within their service territory, and distributed power to their retail customers.”). 
 83. See HAL R. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS: A MODERN APPROACH 11–17 (7th 
ed. 2006) (explaining monopolies and discussing pareto efficiency). 
 84. See id. (“What about the ordinary monopolist who is constrained to charge one price? It 
turns out that this situation is not Pareto efficient.”). 
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Rate regulation emerged as the solution to this problem. 
According to Alfred Kahn, a leading economist who studied the 
regulation of public utilities, “[t]he essence of regulation is the explicit 
replacement of competition with governmental orders as the principal 
institutional device for assuring good performance.”85 In an industry 
that was subject to rate regulation, the government—rather than 
market forces—became responsible for disciplining corporate behavior. 
Utility regulators permitted private firms to act as monopoly suppliers 
and closely regulated their rates and services.86 The utilities that were 
entitled to operate in a given market were required to charge rates that 
were established by an administrator during a ratemaking proceeding. 
To do this, a regulator would calculate a utility’s reasonably incurred 
costs and allow it to recover those costs plus a “reasonable” rate of 
return.87 State regulators, known as public utility commissions 
(“PUCs”) or public service corporations (“PSCs”), regulated retail rates, 
which are the rates consumers pay to the utility that transports 
electricity for use.88 After Congress passed the FPA in 1935, federal 
regulators oversaw wholesale rates, which are the rates transmission 
companies pay for electricity when they purchase it from generators.89 
In short, rate regulation was supported by an economic theory 
that viewed energy companies as natural monopolies. That economic 
theory led many policymakers to think that optimal electric service 
would be provided only if companies enjoyed a legal right to a monopoly. 
Once companies enjoyed a legal right to monopoly control in their 
service territories, markets became vulnerable to market power abuses. 
Controlling utility rates and services in ratemaking proceedings 
allowed regulators to mitigate market power abuses. 
 
 85. 1 KAHN, supra note 50, at 20. 
 86. See JOSKOW & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 35, at 13 (describing the process of franchising 
utilities). 
 87. See Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Nat. Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 621 (1944) (Reed, J., 
dissenting) (“The rates fixed would produce an annual return and that annual return was to be 
compared with a theoretical just and reasonable return, all risks considered, on the fair value of 
the property used and useful in the public service at the time of the determination.”). 
 88. See 16 U.S.C § 824(b) (2012); Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n v. Elec. Power Supply 
Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 766 (2016) (“[T]he law places beyond FERC’s power, and leaves to the States 
alone, the regulation of ‘any other sale’—most notably, any retail sale—of electricity.” (citing 16 
U.S.C. § 824(b))). 
 89. See 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)–(e) (applying federal regulation “to the transmission of electric 
energy in interstate commerce and to the sale of electric energy at wholesale in interstate 
commerce”). When the federal government first began regulating energy markets, an agency called 
the Federal Power Commission (“FPC”) was responsible for regulating wholesale electricity rates 
and the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce. FERC was not created until 1977, 
when the Department of Energy Organization Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7134, 7171 (2012), dissolved the 
FPC and gave FERC most of the responsibilities that had formerly belonged to the FPC. 
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B. Origins of the Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity 
Today, companies that would like to build energy 
infrastructure—especially transmission lines that transport electricity 
and pipelines that transport oil and gas—must first receive a certificate 
of public convenience and necessity before beginning to construct the 
infrastructure. A certificate of public convenience and necessity is a 
license issued by a regulatory body that allows the holder of the permit 
to operate in a particular area.90 For example, to receive regulatory 
approval to build a new transmission line, a company often must 
establish that the line is “in the public interest” and demonstrate the 
line’s “financial viability.”91 In markets with requirements such as 
these, regulatory approval—in addition to the views of the developer 
that would like to build the transmission line—establishes whether 
there is actual demand for a new transmission line and determines 
when firms are able to enter a market.92  
Regulators have offered at least five related justifications for 
laws requiring certificates of public convenience and necessity in the 
energy industry: (1) avoiding “wasteful duplication” of physical 
facilities, (2) preventing “ruinous” or “destructive” competition between 
energy providers,93 (3) cross-subsidizing customers who otherwise 
 
 90. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 10901(c) (2012) (“The Board shall issue a certificate authorizing 
activities for which such authority is requested in an application filed under subsection (b) unless 
the Board finds that such activities are inconsistent with the public convenience and necessity.”). 
 91. Request for Proposals for New or Upgraded Transmission Line Projects Under Section 
1222 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005, 75 Fed. Reg. 32,940, 32,941 (June 10, 2010).  
 92. This is not universally true. Though historically certificates of public convenience and 
necessity involved an assessment of the financial viability of the proposed project, in recent years 
some regulators have relaxed that requirement when licensing new energy projects. For example, 
FERC’s assessment of the financial viability of natural gas pipelines has become very deferential. 
See Order Clarifying Statement of Policy, Certification of New Interstate Natural Gas Pipeline 
Facilities, 90 FERC ¶ 61,128, at 3 (2000), https://www.ferc.gov/legal/maj-ord-reg/PL99-3-001.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/82MZ-3JHT] (stating that “[t]he Commission . . . changed its policy regarding 
the pricing of construction projects so that market decisions by pipelines and shippers, as opposed 
to regulatory tests, would better reveal whether there is sufficient support for the project and 
whether the project is financially viable.”). In the context of transmission line siting, however, 
many states continue to consider whether the developer can “demonstrate the need for the 
proposed facilities and that their construction will not result in the wasteful duplication of 
facilities.” Application of Big Rivers Electric Corporation for a Certificate of Public Convenience 
and Necessity to Construct a 161 KV Transmission Line in Ohio County, Kentucky, No. 2007-
00177, at 10 (Oct. 30, 2007), https://psc.ky.gov/order_vault/Orders_2007/200700177_10302007.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Y2AY-73Q6]. For a description of the historical factors that caused natural gas 
and electric power transmission siting regimes to diverge, see Klass, The Electric Grid at a 
Crossroads, supra note 31, at 1903–21. For a history and overview of gas and oil transportation 
laws, see Alexandra B. Klass & Danielle Meinhardt, Transporting Oil & Gas: U.S. Infrastructure 
Challenges, 100 IOWA L. REV. 947 (2015). 
 93. See Northhampton Elec. Lighting Co., Petitioner, 7 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BOARD OF 
GAS AND ELECTRIC COMMISSIONERS OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS 14, 21 (Jan. 
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would not receive service or who would otherwise have had to pay 
higher prices for service (also known as “cream skimming”),  
(4) protecting investments in assets that have large upfront capital 
costs, and (5) protecting the community against externalities such as 
environmental harms and eminent domain. 
Once regulators decided to grant a company an exclusive 
franchise, they had to ensure that the company retained its market 
dominance.94 Regulators were concerned that competition would lead to 
“wasteful duplication” of the physical facilities needed to generate and 
transport gas and electric power.95 Regulators worried that without 
exclusive franchises, multiple companies would build gas pipelines even 
when a single pipeline was capable of meeting all of a region’s demand 
for gas.96 Competition was thought to be problematic because it 
encouraged companies to make excessive infrastructure investments.  
In addition to concern about wasteful duplication of energy 
infrastructure, concern about destructive competition preoccupied 
energy regulators in the industry’s early years. Specifically, 
policymakers worried that competitors would reduce rates to 
unprofitable levels to drive their competitors out of business.97 Once a 
company drove competitors out of business, it would often raise prices 
and engage in discriminatory service.98 The Massachusetts Railroad 
Commission, for example, explained in a 1908 decision that the state’s 
utility “statutes are founded on the assumption that, to have two or 
more competing companies running lines of gas pipe and conduits for 
electric wires through the same street would often greatly increase the 
necessary cost of furnishing light.”99 When New York passed its own 
utility law, it did not simply aim to prevent monopoly abuses, but also 
named “destructive competition” as one of the evils utility regulation 
was designed to prevent.100 Other states made similar appeals to 
concerns about destructive or ruinous competition, and twentieth 
 
1892) (“[C]apital wisely expended for the purpose of supplying public needs is entitled to be 
protected against destructive competition . . . .”). 
 94. See PHILLIPS, supra note 44, at 4 (“[I]f economic power is not to be controlled by the 
market, it must be controlled by public authority, since a firm’s contribution to the general welfare, 
rather than being the result of voluntary choice, must be compelled.”). 
 95. See id. at 54 (“Competition [between public utilities] is self-destructive and results in a 
waste of scarce resources.”). 
 96. See id. (noting that multiple firms could agree to share the market). 
 97. See id. at 53–54 (“Competition may exist for a time, but only until bankruptcy or merger 
leaves the field to one firm.”). 
 98. See id. at 54 (“[A] monopolist might absorb not only the benefits resulting from the lower 
cost, but also might raise prices.”). 
 99. Weld v. Gas & Elec. Light Comm’rs, 84 N.E. 101, 102 (Mass. 1908). 
 100. See 1 BD. OF R.R. COMM’RS OF N.Y., THIRD ANNUAL REPORT viii, xxix–xxx (Albany, Weed, 
Parsons & Co. 1885). 
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century academics also seem to have accepted that competition was 
problematic in utility industries because it caused multiple firms to 
make infrastructure investments that would turn out to be 
redundant.101 Public utility commissioners regularly echoed this 
concern.102  
Concern about destructive competition was closely related to 
attempts to use public utility regulation to require utility industries to 
provide nondiscriminatory service. If regulators had not restricted 
market entry, competitors would have been able to offer reduced rates 
to the customers that they could serve at the lowest cost and refuse to 
serve other, less financially lucrative customers. The reason that 
competition posed an existential threat to the model of rate-regulated 
public utilities was that it was less expensive for utilities to provide 
service to some customers than to others. For example, utilities often 
operate at a loss when they serve rural customers but make significant 
profits when they serve customers who live in densely populated urban 
areas. That is because the infrastructure that transports electricity to 
urban customers allows the utility to expand its customer base to 
include all of those customers. The transmission lines that serve rural 
areas will cost the same to build but will open up a much smaller 
market.  
Under rate regulation, the utility was required to provide 
nondiscriminatory rates and services to all customers. If an 
unregulated competitor had been allowed to offer the profitable 
customers reduced rates or superior services, they would be able to steal 
those customers from the regulated utility. That would leave the 
incumbent utility with a legal mandate to serve unprofitable customers 
despite the fact that competitors had convinced profitable customers to 
defect. In other words, the regulated utility would have been left with a 
statutory obligation to provide electricity service at regulated rates to 
customers that no one else was willing to serve. The Idaho Public Utility 
Commission captured this concern in a 1918 order. The Commission 
stated that the “whole theory of regulated monopoly . . . would be 
 
 101. See, e.g., Aditya Bamzai, The Wasteful Duplication Thesis in Natural Monopoly 
Regulation, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1525, 1525 (2004) (discussing “the view that a grant of monopoly 
rights prior to excessive competition could preempt the ‘wasteful duplication’ of valuable resources 
by giving one party the exclusive right—and incentive—to invest”); see also SMITH, DOWLING & 
HALE, supra note 46, at 1–6; Horace M. Gray, The Passing of the Public Utility Concept, 16 J. LAND 
& PUB. UTIL. ECON. 8, 11 (1940) (“Certainly many of the proponents of public utility regulation 
intended it to protect consumers against excessive charges and discriminations; all the early state 
laws bear witness to this intent.”). Justice Breyer even used the phrase “wasteful duplication” in 
two opinions authored in the late 1990s and early 2000s. See Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v FCC, 535 
U.S. 467, 539 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); AT&T Corp. v Iowa 
Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 416 (1999) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
 102. See supra notes 93–96 and accompanying text.  
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broken down if . . . a rival might invade a field occupied by a public 
utility . . . and take from it one [or] more of its best patrons.”103  
The certificate of public convenience and necessity emerged 
largely as the solution to these perceived problems. According to the 
California Supreme Court, “[t]he certificate of public convenience and 
necessity is the means whereby protection is given to the utility 
rendering adequate service at a reasonable rate against ruinous 
competition.”104 Regulated utilities were required to provide 
nondiscriminatory rates and services in their service areas. In 
exchange, they were protected from competition so that they could 
honor their service obligations.  
The certificate of public convenience and necessity can be 
understood as a mechanism to ensure that rate-regulated utilities were 
able to use the profits from some customers to cross-subsidize 
customers that they were legally required to serve but who might not 
yield a profit for the utility. By preventing competitors from stealing 
utilities’ most lucrative customers, certificates allowed utilities to use 
the profits generated from profitable customers to sell electricity at 
below-cost rates to less financially remunerative electricity consumers. 
In that way, the certificate of public convenience and necessity ensured 
that utilities were in a financial position to provide nondiscriminatory 
rates and services to all of their customers.  
C. Origins of the Filed Rate Doctrine 
As discussed, the certificate of public convenience and necessity 
ensured that market forces did not undermine cost-of-service 
regulation. The filed rate doctrine promoted a related goal, which was 
to prevent judicial enforcement of state and federal laws from forcing 
rate-regulated utilities to modify rates that they had already filed with 
 
 103. Sandpoint Water & Light Co. v. Humbird Lumber Co., P.U.R. 1918B 535, 547 (Idaho Pub. 
Util. Comm’n 1918). 
 104. Motor Transit Co. v. R.R. Comm’n, 209 P. 586, 589 (Cal. 1922). As discussed in Section 
I.C, it is also possible that the certificate of public convenience and necessity allowed state 
legislatures to give themselves legal authority to impose regulations that otherwise might not have 
survived judicial scrutiny. See id. at 591: 
The primary purpose of the legislature in enacting this statute was not to confer a 
franchise upon the operating companies but to give into the power of the commission 
for regulation and control in the interest of the public the operation of auto stages for 
transportation. It did this by requiring every auto transportation company to secure 
from the commission a certificate of public convenience and necessity;  
Ex parte Russell, 126 P. 875, 876 (Cal. 1912), rev’d sub nom. Russell v. Sebastian, 233 U.S. 195 
(1914) (“[The] provision expressly limits the pre-existing powers and rights available to private 
corporations and natural persons. They are permitted to engage in such enterprises within the city 
only ‘upon such conditions and under such regulations as the municipality may prescribe.’ ”). 
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state and federal regulators. Judicial enforcement that altered rates 
could, among other things, thwart the nondiscrimination mandate built 
into ratemaking proceedings. Thus, like rate regulation and the 
certificate of public convenience and necessity, the filed rate doctrine 
was originally designed to protect consumer interests in the era of rate-
regulated utilities. Specifically, it prevented utilities’ customers and 
regulators from invoking legal rules to force utilities to deviate from the 
rates they filed with regulators.105 
In ratemaking proceedings, regulators are supposed to carefully 
scrutinize utility rates to make sure that rates are just and 
reasonable.106 The filed rate doctrine often forecloses judicial review of 
a wide swath of legal rules, including state and federal antitrust, tort, 
and contract law.107 In this way, the filed rate doctrine prevents utilities 
from being forced to deviate from the rates that they filed with 
regulators absent the approval of the energy regulator charged with 
supervising the utility’s rates and services. 
The Supreme Court formally established the filed rate doctrine 
in Keogh v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co., after a group of 
merchants sued railroads for colluding to establish rates.108 The 
Interstate Commerce Act (“ICA”) prohibited rate discrimination.109 To 
ensure that utilities did not favor certain customers, the Interstate 
Commerce Commission (“ICC”) ordered utilities and public service 
commissions to publish filed tariffs and prohibited railroads from 
secretly departing from those tariffs.110  
 
 105. Rossi, supra note 11, at 1602 (“The filed tariff doctrine was originally intended to protect 
consumers . . . .”). 
 106. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 COLUM. 
L. REV. 773, 808 n.112 (2001): 
Under this [filed rate] doctrine, utilities and common carriers must establish their rates 
and services in standard form contracts called tariffs, which must be made available on 
equal and nondiscriminatory terms to all customers. Deviations from the filed tariff are 
not permitted, but the relevant regulatory agency is authorized to review and adjust 
the terms to ensure that they are “just and reasonable” to affected customers. 
 107. See Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 476 U.S. 409, 424 (1986) 
(affirming dismissal under Keogh of case to recover treble damages for alleged antitrust violation); 
Keogh v. Chi. & Nw. Ry. Co., 260 U.S. 156, 162 (1922) (establishing the filed rate doctrine and 
dismissing Plaintiff’s antitrust claim against railroad companies); California ex rel. Lockyer v. 
Dynegy, Inc., 375 F.3d 831, 853 (9th Cir. 2004) (dismissing tort actions due to their preemption 
under the filed rate doctrine); Cty. of Stanislaus v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 114 F.3d 858, 863 (9th 
Cir. 1997) (holding that the filed rate doctrine bars all three of Plaintiffs’ asserted antitrust 
claims); Sun City Taxpayers’ Ass’n v. Citizens Utils. Co., 45 F.3d 58, 61–62 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding 
that the filed rate doctrine precludes a racketeering action). 
 108. 260 U.S. at 163. 
 109. Id. at 164. 
 110. See id. at 163 (“The legal rights of shipper as against carrier in respect to a rate are 
measured by the published tariff. Unless and until suspended or set aside, this rate is made, for 
all purposes, the legal rate, as between carrier and shipper.”); Adam Candeub, The Common 
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The Plaintiff in Keogh was a manufacturer who used 
Defendants’ railroads to ship goods he manufactured.111 The Plaintiff 
claimed that the Defendant railroad companies violated section 7 of the 
Sherman Antitrust Act.112 The ICC and the railroads argued that 
regulators—not courts—were responsible for determining the validity 
of rates and that, once they did so, railroads were shielded from judicial 
enforcement of private antitrust suits.113 The Supreme Court agreed, 
claiming that private enforcement of antitrust law was at odds with the 
ICA’s goal of preventing rate discrimination.114 According to the Court,  
[t]his stringent rule prevails, because otherwise the paramount purpose of Congress— 
prevention of unjust discrimination—might be defeated. If a shipper could recover under 
section 7 of the Anti-Trust Act for damages resulting from the exaction of a rate higher 
than that which would otherwise have prevailed, the amount recovered might, like a 
rebate, operate to give him a preference over his trade competitors.115  
The Supreme Court was especially concerned that judicial 
enforcement of antitrust laws could prevent the ICC from effectively 
controlling utility rates and services. The Court speculated that “it is 
possible that no lower rate . . . could have been legally maintained 
without reconstituting the whole rate structure for many articles 
moving in an important section of the country.”116 The Supreme Court 
thus recognized that antitrust actions that resulted in lower rates in 
one area might disrupt a region’s entire rate framework by making it 
difficult for utilities to provide adequate and profitable service across 
their entire service areas.  
Other early Supreme Court cases reflected a similar concern 
with making sure that judicial decisions did not undermine the rates 
energy companies filed with public utility commissions. The Court often 
emphasized, for example, that the filed rate doctrine protected utilities’ 
nondiscrimination mandates. This concern is evident in filed rate cases 
that preceded Keogh. Though Keogh is generally considered the seminal 
filed rate case, the doctrine can be traced back to at least 1906, when 
the Supreme Court held that congressional legislation prohibiting 
discriminatory rates and services required that utilities be exempt from 
 
Carrier Privacy Model, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 805, 821 (2018) (noting the placement of interstate 
communications under the supervision of the ICC and the requirement that telegraph companies 
file tariffs with the ICC); Kearney & Merrill, supra note 63, at 1331–32 (“[T]he carrier’s tariffs, 
which were filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) and made available for public 
inspection both there and elsewhere, defined all aspects of the carrier-customer relationship.”). 
 111. 260 U.S. at 159–62. 
 112. Id. at 159. 
 113. Id. at 160. 
 114. Id. at 163. 
 115. Id. at 163. 
 116. Id. at 164. 
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judicial enforcement of state antitrust laws.117 In one case, the Supreme 
Court found that judicial enforcement of antitrust laws were preempted 
once a rate had been filed with a utility regulator because preemption 
was necessary “to secure equality of rates as to all, and to destroy 
favoritism.”118 In another, decided in 1915, the Court reiterated that the 
doctrine “embodies the policy which ha[d] been adopted by Congress in 
the regulation of interstate commerce in order to prevent unjust 
discrimination.”119 If the judiciary required utilities to provide 
differential rates and services by enforcing antitrust and tort, it would 
have forced utilities to deviate from the rates approved by public utility 
commissions. 
Thus, the filed rate doctrine, like rate regulation and the 
certificate of public convenience and necessity, was designed to protect 
consumers from the particular regulatory challenges generated by cost-
of-service regulation. Rate-regulated utilities were excepted from 
competitive markets. To protect consumers from monopolistic pricing, 
regulators controlled the rates and services that utilities charged. To 
ensure that new entrants did not undermine utilities’ exclusive 
franchises, regulators limited entry by requiring energy companies to 
receive a certificate of public convenience and necessity before entering 
a market. And the Supreme Court created the filed rate doctrine to 
prevent ordinary tort and antitrust suits from forcing utilities to 
provide discriminatory rates and services that deviated from those filed 
with energy regulators.120   
IV. ZOMBIE ENERGY LAWS 
While the three doctrines described in the previous Part were all 
originally intended to protect consumers by preserving the delicate 
regulatory balance required to respect cost-of-service regulation, today 
 
 117. See N.Y., New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 200 U.S. 361, 
391 (1906) (“That a carrier engaged in interstate commerce becomes subject as to such commerce 
to the commands of the statute, and may not set its provisions at naught whatever otherwise may 
be its power when carrying on commerce not interstate in character, cannot in reason be denied.”). 
 118. Id.; see also Dayton Coal & Iron Co. v. Cincinnati, New Orleans & Tex. Pac. Ry. Co., 239 
U.S. 446, 451 (1915) (“That it is essential to the maintenance of uniform rates and the avoidance 
of rebates and preferential treatment that the tariff rates filed with the Commission according to 
the Interstate Commerce Act . . . shall be the only rates which the carrier may lawfully 
receive . . . .”). 
 119. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Maxwell, 237 U.S. 94, 97 (1915). 
 120. Interestingly, the legal basis for many early filed rate cases was that the rates utilities 
filed with public utility commissions were a form of federal legislation. See Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. 
Mugg, 202 U.S. 242, 245 (1906) (“[W]hatever may be the rate agreed upon, the carrier’s lien on the 
goods is, by force of the act of Congress, for the amount fixed by the published schedule of rates 
and charges . . . .”). 
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those doctrines distort electric power markets and impede the 
development of renewable energy sources. This Part explains how the 
legal rules that were designed to mitigate the market power abuses of 
utilities subject to cost-of-service regulation have the opposite effect in 
restructured markets. 
A. Zombie Rate Regulation 
Although FERC attempted to unbundle generation from 
transmission, the Commission ultimately did not force utilities to fully 
divest themselves of their generation assets. Instead being required to 
sell or spin off their generation assets, utilities that owned transmission 
lines remained able to own and operate generation facilities as well so 
long as they provided independent power producers with 
nondiscriminatory access to their transmission lines.121 FERC’s efforts 
to force utilities to unbundle transmission and generation was intended 
to make generators compete on an equal playing field. In practice, 
however, FERC’s failure to require utilities to fully divest themselves 
of their generation assets has allowed utilities to manipulate generation 
bids in a manner that ensures that generators owned by vertically 
integrated utilities continue to operate despite being unable to compete 
with alternative electricity providers.  
In restructured markets, grid operators oversee a bidding 
process that determines which generators will provide electricity to 
meet demand in a given period of time.122 The utilities responsible for 
distributing electricity to end users—known as load-serving entities—
purchase electricity from a centralized market.123 Load-serving entities 
tell the grid operators their demand requirement, and the generators 
that compete to serve the market submit bids in which they offer a price 
at which they are willing to provide an amount of power (in megawatt-
 
 121. See Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory 
Transmission Services by Public Utilities, Order No. 888, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540, 21,552 (May 10, 
1996) (“We conclude that functional unbundling of wholesale services is necessary to implement 
non-discriminatory open access transmission and that corporate unbundling should not now be 
required.”). 
 122. For an overview of this process, see Joshua Macey & Jackson Salovaara, Rate Regulation 
Redux, 168 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 16–19), https://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3362920 [https://perma.cc/B38Q-58C5]. 
 123. See FRANCISCO FLORES-ESPINO ET AL., NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., COMPETITIVE 
ELECTRICITY MARKET REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES: A PRIMER 12–13 (2016), 
https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy17osti/67106.pdf [https://perma.cc/B78F-7NH8] (“A transparent 
wholesale spot market coordinated by an independent entity forms the foundation of competitive 
electricity markets in the United States.” (footnote omitted)).  
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hours, or “MWh”).124 The grid operator then determines how much 
electricity is needed to meet all demand for electricity and identifies 
which generators are able to provide power to the region at the lowest 
cost.125 Generators that submit successful bids are said to “clear” the 
market.126 The least expensive resources clear the market first, followed 
by the next cheapest options, until the grid operator is able to provide 
enough electricity to match the region’s demand for electricity.127 Every 
supplier is paid the price offered by the last generator to clear.128 
In theory, generators that participate in a competitive market 
will generally bid the marginal costs, which are the costs they incur in 
providing an additional unit of electricity in a given moment.129 If the 
generator submitted a bid below its marginal costs, it would risk being 
dispatched when the costs of producing electricity are greater than the 
revenues the generator would receive by selling electricity into the 
wholesale market. If a generator submits a bid above its variable costs, 
it risks not being dispatched when it would be profitable to operate. 
Because all dispatched generators are paid the price offered by the last 
resource to clear, a generator that clears the market will make the same 
amount of money regardless of its bid. That is because a market that 
clears at $40 per MWh will pay all generators $40 per MWh. Thus, a 
generator that can operate at $10 per MWh will be paid $40 per MWh 
regardless of whether the generator bids $20 or $10 per MWh. But if 
the generator bids at $20 per MWh, it will risk not being dispatched if 
the market clears at $15 per MWh despite the fact that the generator 
would have made money if it had sold electric power for $15 per MWh. 
In theory, merit order dispatch is supposed to ensure that 
consumers receive electricity at the lowest cost.130 In practice, however, 
 
 124. See id. (“In competitive markets, generators submit offers to the system operator based 
on the incremental cost to produce energy and the amount of power they want to sell.”). 
 125. Id. 
 126. See id. (“In real-time markets, the volume of energy traded is the difference between 
energy commitments cleared in day-ahead markets and the energy actually needed in the system 
to meet demand.”). 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. See MICHAEL MILLIGAN ET AL., NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., MARGINAL COST PRICING 
IN A WORLD WITHOUT PERFECT COMPETITION: IMPLICATIONS FOR ELECTRICITY MARKETS WITH 
HIGH SHARES OF LOW MARGINAL COST RESOURCES 4–5 (2017), https://www.nrel.gov/ 
docs/fy18osti/69076.pdf [https://perma.cc/UD6R-5CRJ] (“Perfectly competitive markets can be 
shown to achieve short-run equilibrium at the point at which price equals marginal cost.”). 
 130. See How Resources Are Selected and Prices Are Set in the Wholesale Energy Markets, ISO 
NEW ENGLAND, https://www.iso-ne.com/about/what-we-do/in-depth/how-resources-are-selected-
and-prices-are-set (last visited May 7, 2020) [https://perma.cc/T9CG-AH9J] (“Every five minutes 
of every day, ISO New England chooses resources to produce just the right amount of electricity to 
meet the region’s demand, but we also choose the least expensive resources available to meet that 
demand.”). 
3_Macey (Do Not Delete) 5/22/2020  6:55 PM 
1108 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:4:1077 
there are a few ways for generators to operate “out of merit” and send 
electricity to the grid even when market conditions render it 
uneconomic for them to do so. Specifically, generators can self-schedule 
or submit bids that are below their costs of production. When a 
generator self-schedules (also known as self-committing), it identifies 
the hours in which it operates and commits to providing a certain 
amount of electricity during those times regardless of the market 
clearing price.131 Like all generators that clear, it receives the market 
clearing price.132  
There are justifiable reasons for generators to self-schedule. For 
example, generators that incur high costs when they  turn on or off may 
prefer to operate at a loss some of the time to ensure that they do not 
incur startup costs when wholesale prices rise.133  It is expensive to turn 
nuclear and coal-fired power plants on and off.134 Nuclear and coal 
generators may therefore be willing to send electricity into the grid even 
when they lose money doing so because they would like to avoid startup 
and shutdown costs. By self-scheduling, they know that they will be 
able to ramp up production when prices increase without having to 
incur these start-up costs. Grid operators count generators that self-
schedule in the merit order as zero-cost bids.135 
Alternatively, generators may simply submit a bid that is below 
their cost of production. If the bid is low enough, this will ensure that 
the generator clears the market. It is not clear why a generator would 
submit bids below their production costs absent some other source of 
revenue.136 
 
 131. Grid operators count self-scheduled bids as zero-cost bids in the supply curve. See, e.g., 
Authorization to Self-Schedule Capacity, PJM, https://www.pjm.com/~/media/etools/erpm/ 
20070302-rpm-authorization-self-sched.ashx (last visited May 7, 2020) [https://perma.cc/T3QH-
2DFT] (“Because PJM will self-schedule the Unit, Owner recognizes that the Unit’s offer will 
always clear an auction . . . .”). 
 132. See id. (“[The] Owner must accept the applicable clearing price.”). 
 133. See N.Y. Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 167 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,057, at P 22 (2019). 
 134. See HERMINÉ NALBANDIAN-SUGDEN, IEA CLEAN COAL CTR., OPERATING RATIO AND COST 
OF COAL POWER GENERATION  41 (Dec. 2016), https://www.usea.org/sites/default/files/ 
Operating%20ratio%20and%20cost%20of%20coal%20power%20generation%20-%20ccc272-1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ZC64-FCJD] (“[O]ne full start-up may require additional fuel use with costs in 
the order of €30,000 (hot) and €100,000 (cold) for coal-fired power plants of 1000 MW capacity. The 
cost for starting a nuclear power plant is higher at €200,000 per start.”). 
 135. See SOUTHWEST POWER POOL, MKT. MONITORING UNIT, SELF-COMMITTING IN SPP 
MARKETS: OVERVIEW, IMPACTS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 6 (Dec. 2019), https:// 
assets.documentcloud.org/documents/6573451/Spp-Mmu-Self-Commitment-Whitepaper.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5NZA-BSJ2] (“When participants self-commit resources, the commitment 
algorithm does not make the decision to commit those units based on their cost. Participants make 
their own commitment decisions without regard to the optimization of total costs. Said another 
way, these resources effectively move themselves to the bottom of the cost curve.”). 
 136. Generators that receive subsidies such as tax credits for operating may submit bids that 
are technically below their production costs. For example, wind receives a tax credit worth $23 per 
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While generators may occasionally have legitimate reasons to 
operate even when it is unprofitable for them to do so, coal-fired power 
plants owned by vertically integrated utilities seem to be recouping 
losses they incur in energy markets from their captive ratepayers. 
Many state regulators continue to allow vertically integrated utilities 
to recover their costs even when those utilities participate in 
restructured markets.137 This practice allows generation facilities 
owned by vertically integrated utilities to manipulate competitive 
energy markets, which seriously distorts energy market prices and 
reduces revenues enjoyed by generators that could offer electricity more 
competitively, including solar and wind generators. Imagine if a coal-
fired power plant needs $100 million a year to operate in a market. A 
generator that submits an uneconomic, $0 bid into energy markets 
reduces the revenues received by every other generator that 
participates in wholesale energy auctions. If the coal-fired power plant 
had not bid $0, another facility would have cleared the energy auction. 
That is because when an uneconomic generator is dispatched because 
it submits an anticompetitive bid, it replaces a unit that would have 
been dispatched had the coal-fired generator not submitted a bid below 
its marginal costs of production. Without the coal-fired generator’s bid, 
a different generator that had submitted a higher bid would have been 
dispatched and would have set the energy market clearing price. That, 
in turn, would have raised the price paid to all generators in the market.  
The coal generator does not mind the suppressive effect of its low 
bid because it recovers its energy market losses from its ratepayers. In 
fact, insofar as it owns the transmission assets that are required to 
purchase electricity from energy markets, it might stand to benefit from 
suppressed energy market prices.138 But the generators whose 
 
MWh. Herman K. Trabish, Prognosis Negative: How California Is Dealing with Below-Zero Power 
Market Prices, UTILITY DIVE (May 11, 2017), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/prognosis-
negative-how-california-is-dealing-with-below-zero-power-market/442130/ [https://perma.cc/ 
Z7JH-3FD3]. Wind generators may therefore be willing to submit negative bids—they are willing 
to pay the grid operator to produce electricity. The production tax credit allows clean generation 
facilities to submit lower-cost bids than they otherwise would and thereby ensures that they clear 
more frequently. See id. (noting that the tax credit and California’s renewable energy mandates 
allow solar and wind energy sources “to be dispatched first in the generation stack, giving them 
greater influence over power prices”). Note that unlike the strategies vertically integrated utilities 
have adopted, the production tax credit rewards generators that provide clean energy and operates 
inside of energy markets. The tactics described in the rest of this Section do not operate inside of 
energy markets and do not provide revenue for anything of value. 
 137. See Calpine Corp. v. PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 163 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,236, at 8 (Glick, C., 
dissenting) (2018) (“Roughly 20 percent of the installed capacity within PJM is owned by vertically 
integrated utilities. Those utilities are guaranteed to recover the cost [of] their resources, 
irrespective of the price they receive in PJM’s capacity market.”). 
 138. A vertically integrated utility that operates in a restructured market and that owns 
transmission and generation assets is generally required to purchase electricity from wholesale 
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profitability is based on wholesale energy market auctions are harmed 
because they now receive lower rates. Thus, by using cost-of-service 
regulation to prolong the life of uneconomic coal generators, utilities not 
only increase electricity costs for consumers, but also decrease 
compensation for energy sources—including renewables—whose 
revenues are derived from energy market prices. Because grid operators 
count self-scheduled generators in the merit order and count them as 
bidding zero, coal-fired power plants displace generators that would 
clear energy auctions if the auctions were actually being run 
competitively.  
Many long-term renewable energy projects are financed by 
power purchase agreements (“PPAs”) that are based off of estimated 
future market prices,139 and PURPA’s avoided cost calculation is often 
based on projections about future energy market prices. Thus, strategic 
bidding by vertically integrated utilities harms more than just the 
utility customers that pay more for electricity and the generators that 
already participate in competitive energy markets and rely on 
wholesale market revenues to fund their continued operations. It also 
reduces the incentives for new merchant generators to enter the market 
and in this way deters the construction of new generation facilities even 
if new facilities could provide electricity at a lower cost than 
incumbents. 
An analysis conducted by Synapse and the Sierra Club 
estimated that uneconomic dispatch of coal-fired generators owned by 
vertically integrated utilities has cost ratepayers $3.5 billion between 
2015 and 2017.140 Duke Energy is seeking cost recovery for three coal-
fired power plants that would allow it to receive close to $1 billion from 
ratepayers.141 It therefore seems that vertically integrated utilities are 
sometimes willing to accept a loss in energy markets because they can 
recover costs from captive ratepayers. This practice ensures that 
uneconomic generators continue to operate and reduces revenues 
 
energy auctions. Since low bids submitted by the utility’s generation assets reduce the clearing 
price, the utility reduces its costs by driving wholesale prices down. 
 139. See Physical Power Purchase Agreements, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, 
https://www.epa.gov/greenpower/financial-power-purchase-agreements (last visited May 7, 2020) 
[https://perma.cc/A57V-8Z4U] (“A financial PPA (Financial PPA) is a financial arrangement 
between a renewable electricity generator (the seller) and a customer, that enables both parties to 
hedge against electricity market price volatility.”). 
 140. Fisher et al., supra note 21, at 4. 
 141. See Testimony of Tyler Comings at 28, Petition of Duke Energy Indiana, LLC, No. 45253 
(Ind. Util. Regulatory Comm’n Oct. 30, 2019), https://iurc.portal.in.gov/_entity/ 
sharepointdocumentlocation/0173ef4f-5b48-ea11-a999-001dd8009f4b/bb9c6bba-fd52-45ad-8e64-
a444aef13c39?file=45253%20PUBLIC%20Tyler%20Comings%20Direct%20Testimony%20Revise
d.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZM7Q-KU7R] (“Duke is seeking cost recovery in this docket for all of its 
generation units.”). 
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enjoyed by generators that could offer electricity more competitively, 
including solar and wind generators.  
Nor is cost recovery in a ratemaking proceeding the only way 
that cost-of-service regulation allows vertically integrated utilities to 
insulate themselves from the price signals sent by competitive energy 
markets. Arcane aspects of cost-of-service regulation known as price 
“trackers” and “fuel adjustment clauses” allow generators owned by 
vertically integrated utilities to pass along fuel costs to their captive 
customers.142 Many power plants owned by vertically integrated 
utilities enter take-or-pay contracts that obligate them to pay for fuel 
even if they do not run.143 Coal-fired power plants owned by rate-
regulated utilities thus pay for—and pass on to consumers—the costs 
of fuel regardless of whether they actually operate. In this way, fuel 
adjustment clauses authorize vertically integrated utilities to recover 
fuel costs from their captive ratepayers.144 Utilities need not receive 
formal authorization from a public service commission in a ratemaking 
proceeding to use these clauses. When this rate adjustment occurs 
automatically, utilities have little incentive to internalize fuel costs in 
energy bids because they can pass those costs on to their customers and 
need not worry that a public utility commission will prevent them from 
recovering those costs. This creates an additional revenue source for 
vertically integrated utilities outside of the energy markets overseen by 
grid operators.  
A central premise of restructured energy markets is that less 
expensive generators should be dispatched before more expensive 
 
 142. See Fuel Adjustment Clauses & Other Cost Trackers, ELECTRICITY CONSUMERS RESOURCE 
COUNCIL, https://elcon.org/fuel-adjustment-clauses-cost-trackers/ (last visited May 7, 2020) 
[https://perma.cc/REC3-49AZ] (“A fuel adjustment clause (FAC) is a tariff provision which permits 
a change in rates to occur as a result of a change in the cost of fuel or a portion of purchased power 
expenses. These changes occur without the utility filing a formal rate case.”); Travis Kavulla, 
Reviewed Work: “The Billion-Dollar Coal Bailout Nobody Is Talking About: Self-Committing in 
Power Markets,” R STREET (June 12, 2019), https://www.rstreet.org/2019/06/12/reviewed-work-the-
billion-dollar-coal-bailout-nobody-is-talking-about-self-committing-in-power-markets/ 
[https://perma.cc/6X9H-2EGT] (“Today, without exception, each state with regulated generation 
has a tracker for fuel costs. However, these mechanisms have one huge problem: By eliminating a 
utility’s opportunity to earn additional profit (or incur a loss) on fuel, the utility is deprived of a 
financial incentive to improve their fuel-contracting behavior.”). 
 143. See Daniel R. Rogers & Merrick White, Key Considerations in Energy Take-or-Pay 
Contracts, KING & SPALDING (Apr. 1, 2013), https://www.kslaw.com/blog-posts/key-considerations-
energy-take-pay-contracts [https://perma.cc/8WUZ-W7J9] (“While take-or-pay is not the only way 
to manage delivery obligations in long-term commodity sales agreements, it remains the most 
common form.”). 
 144. See, e.g., The Fuel Adjustment Clause: Frequently Asked Questions, PUB. SERV. 
COMMISSION OF KY. 1, https://psc.ky.gov/agencies/psc/consumer/FAC%20QandA.pdf (last visited 
May 7, 2020) [https://perma.cc/K5G9-JAF9] (“The [fuel adjustment clause] allows utilities to 
reflect those fluctuations [in fuel prices] in their electric rates without having to request changes 
in their base rates.”). 
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generators.145 Merit order dispatch is supposed to ensure that 
consumers receive electricity as inexpensively as possible. But that 
assumption does not seem to apply to many coal-fired power plants 
owned by vertically integrated utilities. By using ratemaking 
proceedings to allow the uneconomic dispatch of coal-fired generators 
that lose money in wholesale energy markets, vertically integrated 
utilities have found a way to ensure that the generators they own can 
operate despite the fact that it costs more for them to do so. As discussed 
in Section III.A, utility rate regulation was originally intended to 
prevent utilities from charging monopolistic prices. Now that FERC 
relies on market forces to procure electricity at the lowest cost, however, 
the ability of vertically integrated energy utilities to use ratemaking 
proceedings to recover the losses they incur in wholesale markets is 
undermining the Commission’s goals, which “are to promote 
competition and help American consumers gain access to reliable and 
affordable energy.”146 
B. Zombie Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity Rules 
Beginning in the 1930s, when the Supreme Court repudiated its 
substantive due process cases, public service commissioners no longer 
had to protect companies from competition in order to impose 
substantive regulations.147 The intellectual scaffolding that 
undergirded utility rate regulation took a bit longer to crumble than did 
the legal doctrines that originally justified certificates of public 
convenience and necessity. Once regulators embraced competitive 
energy markets in the 1970s, however, there were no longer economic 
reasons for regulators to assess the demand for a product before 
authorizing a company to enter a market.  
Despite attempts to encourage competition in electric power 
markets, states have not eliminated laws requiring companies to 
receive a certificate of public convenience and necessity in order to build 
 
 145. In Order 888, FERC explained that it relies on market processes “to bring more efficient, 
lower cost power to the Nation’s electricity consumers.” Promoting Wholesale Competition 
Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities, Order No. 
888, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540, 21,541 (May 10, 1996). 
 146. Apache Corp. v. FERC, 627 F.3d 1220, 1221 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 147. See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 538 (1937) (“[A]ppropriate statutes passed in an 
honest effort to correct the threatened consequences may not be set aside because the regulation 
adopted fixes prices reasonably deemed by the Legislature to be fair to those engaged in the 
industry and to the consuming public.”); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399–400 
(1937) (“The community may direct its law-making power to correct the abuse which springs from 
their selfish disregard of the public interest.”). 
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new energy infrastructure.148 These requirements protect incumbents, 
raise electricity prices, and obstruct green energy projects. Consider the 
case of Clean Line Energy, which tried to build a $3.5 billion wind 
development project but abandoned it after failing to receive a 
certificate of public convenience and necessity from the Arkansas Public 
Service Commission.149 The project would have connected a large wind 
development in Oklahoma to cities on the east coast.150 It also would 
have lowered electricity prices by millions of dollars and generated 
thousands of jobs.151 
The Arkansas Public Service Commission (“PSC”) blocked the 
project after Entergy, an Arkansas utility, filed an objection in which it 
argued that Clean Line Energy was not legally authorized to build 
transmission lines in Arkansas. Entergy pointed out that only public 
utilities can build transmission lines in Arkansas, and that Arkansas 
law defines “public utility” as a company that “own[s] or operat[es] in 
[Arkansas] equipment or facilities for . . . transmitting . . . power to or 
for the public for compensation.”152 The Arkansas law creates a catch-
22. Because Clean Line did not own or operate any transmission lines 
in Arkansas, it was not a public utility. And because it was not a public 
utility, it was not authorized to build transmission lines.  
Entergy is one of only four investor-owned utilities operating in 
the state.153 In denying Clean Line’s petition for a certificate of public 
convenience and necessity, the Arkansas PSC emphasized that it 
“strongly supports the improvement of the transmission system in this 
state as a means to lower energy costs for Arkansas ratepayers.”154 The 
PSC also commended Clean Line for proposing a project that would 
“stimulate economic development, promote wider choice and 
 
 148. See NAT’L ASS’N OF REGULATORY UTIL. COMM’RS, 1975 ANNUAL REPORT ON UTILITY AND 
CARRIER REGULATION 507–20, 560–65, 575–78, 601–04 (1976) (providing a taxonomy of state 
public utility laws). 
 149. Order, The Application of Plains and Eastern Clean Line LLC for a Certificate of Public 
Convenience and Necessity to Construct, Own, and Operate as an Electric Transmission Public 
Utility in the State of Arkansas, No. 10-041-U, at 11 (Ark. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Jan. 11, 2011), 
http://www.apscservices.info/pdf/10/10-041-u_41_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/A839-29CL]. 
 150. Id. at 3. 
 151. See id.; Benjamin Peters, PSC Reluctantly Denies Clean Line’s Application for a Third 
Time, MO. TIMES (Aug. 16, 2017), https://themissouritimes.com/psc-reluctantly-denies-clean-lines-
application-third-time/ [https://perma.cc/HSV4-UX7B] (explaining that some estimated that Clean 
Line’s project would have created “1,500 jobs in the state” and “save[d] ratepayers millions in 
energy savings” by providing clean, low-cost energy). 
 152. ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-1-101(9)(A)(i) (2020). 
 153. See Electric Section, ARK. PUB. SERV. COMMISSION, http://www.apscservices.info/ 
electric.asp (last visited May 7, 2020) [https://perma.cc/M4RK-LQGH]. The state also has a few 
small municipal utilities. See id. 
 154. Order, supra note 149, at 11. 
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competition in wholesale generation, and reduce pollution.”155 The 
Arkansas PSC even recognized  
that the law governing public utilities was not drafted to comprehend changes in the 
utility industry such as this one—where a non-utility, private enterprise endeavors to fill 
a void in the transmission of renewable power that is much needed but for which the 
Commission is unable to afford any regulatory oversight.156  
Still, despite recognizing that “there is some circularity” in the 
Arkansas public utility statute, the Commission felt that its hands were 
tied and denied Clean Line’s request for a certificate of public 
convenience and necessity.157 
Clean Line has also struggled to obtain a certificate of public 
convenience and necessity outside of Arkansas. For example, the 
Missouri PSC refused to approve Clean Line’s request for a certificate, 
which was necessary for the company to build merchant transmission 
lines.158 The Missouri PSC observed that the project would not support 
the reliable provision of electricity in the state and that it was not in 
the public interest because the harm that it would cause to landowners 
outweighed any in-state benefits the project would provide.159 Similarly, 
the Illinois Supreme Court echoed the Arkansas PSC and overturned 
an Illinois PSC decision to grant Clean Line a certificate of public 
convenience and necessity on the ground that Clean Line did not 
already own transmission infrastructure and thus did not qualify as a 
utility under state law.160 
Clean Line’s wind project is far from the only clean energy 
development that has struggled with outdated public convenience and 
necessity laws. The American Electric Power Company gave up on a 
proposed $4.5 billion wind project after regulators in Oklahoma 
 
 155. Id. at 3 (citations omitted). 
 156. Id. at 10. 
 157. See id. at 11.  
 158. The Application of Grain Belt Express Clean Line LLC for a Certificate of Convenience 
and Necessity Authorizing It to Construct, Own, Operate, Control, Manage, and Maintain a High 
Voltage, Direct Current Transmission Line and an Associated Converter Station Providing an 
Interconnection on the Maywood–Montgomery 345 kV Transmission Line, No. EA-2014-0207, at 
22, 25–26 (Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm’n July 1, 2015), https://www.efis.psc.mo.gov/ 
mpsc/CommonComponents/view_itemno_details.asp?caseno=EA-2014-
020701&attach_id=2016000069 [https://perma.cc/FD2Y-QSEF]. 
 159. Id.  
 160. Ill. Landowners All., NFP v. Ill. Commerce Comm’n, 90 N.E.3d 448, 462 (Ill. 2017): 
Because only public utilities are eligible to receive certificates of public convenience and 
necessity under section 8-406 of the Public Utilities Act  and because Rock Island [Clean 
Line] cannot meet the ownership test necessary to qualify as a public utility, the 
Commission’s order granting Rock Island a certificate of public convenience and 
necessity fails as a matter of law and cannot be sustained. 
(citation omitted). 
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determined that the state did not need additional electricity.161 The 
project would have saved Texas customers $4 billion in electricity fees 
over its twenty-five year life.162 Regulators in Illinois,163 Iowa,164 
Kentucky,165 and Missouri166 have reached similar decisions, in each 
case denying a certificate to clean energy developments either because 
the developer did not qualify as a utility or because the state did not 
find that there was demand for the project. 
Numerous academics have shown that protective transmission 
line siting laws benefit incumbents, raise electricity prices, and reduce 
competition.167 One reason restrictive transmission siting laws pose 
 
 161. See Edward Klump, Texas Rejection Dims Outlook for AEP’s Wind Outlook Plan, 
GOVERNORS’ WIND & SOLAR ENERGY COMMISSION (July 30, 2018), 
https://governorswindenergycoalition.org/texas-rejection-dims-outlook-for-aeps-wind-catcher-
plan/ [https://perma.cc/Z6TH-X28R].  
 162. See Sonal Patel, AEP’s $4.5B Wind Catcher Project Gets Louisiana’s Approval, 
POWERMAG (June 21, 2018), https://www.powermag.com/aeps-4-5b-wind-catcher-project-gets-
louisianas-approval/ [https://perma.cc/UW94-RRPE] (noting AEP’s claim that the project, which 
required approval from Texas regulators, would “save customers more than $4 billion over its 25-
year life”). 
 163. See Becky Yerak, Battle Over $600M Wind Power Superhighway Heads to Illinois 
Supreme Court, CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 1, 2016), https://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-grundy-
county-transmission-1201-biz-20161130-story.html [https://perma.cc/Z95A-5YVB] (reporting on 
rejection of project that would have powered 1.4 million homes). 
 164. See James Lynch, GOP Lawmakers Propose Limits on Eminent Domain, Rock Island 
Clean Line, COURIER (Jan. 11, 2014), http://thegazette.com/2014/01/10/iowa-gop-lawmakers-
propose-limits-on-eminent-domain-rock-island-cleanline [https://perma.cc/7DBT-XA3].  
 165. See Application of AEP Kentucky Transmission Company, Inc. for a Certificate of Public 
Convenience and Necessity Pursuant to KRS 278.020 to Provide Wholesale Transmission Service 
in the Commonwealth, No. 2011-00042, at 7–8 (Ky. Pub. Serv. Comm’n June 10, 2013), 
https://psc.ky.gov/PSCSCF/2011%20Cases/2011-00042/20130610_PSC_ORDER.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/QBB6-W6TU]. 
 166. See Andra B. Stefanoni, Panel’s Silence Indicates Approval of Arkansas Power Line, 
JOPLIN GLOBE (Feb. 19, 2014), http://www.joplinglobe.com/ topstories/x129173414/Panel-s-silence-
indicates-approval-of-Arkansas-power-line [https://perma.cc/S8LS-64JM].  
 167. See, e.g., BIPARTISAN POLICY CTR., CAPITALIZING ON THE EVOLVING POWER SECTOR: 
POLICIES FOR A MODERN AND RELIABLE U.S. ELECTRIC GRID 28–33 (2013) (critiquing the 
regulatory regime governing siting of interstate electric transmission lines); MASS. INST. OF TECH., 
THE FUTURE OF THE ELECTRIC GRID: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY MIT STUDY 77 (2011) (arguing that 
transmission line siting laws are a “significant hurdle” to necessary transmission system 
expansion); James W. Coleman, Pipelines & Power-Lines: Building the Energy Transport Future, 
80 OHIO ST. L.J. 263, 266–67 (2019) (critiquing pipeline siting procedures and proposing 
improvements); Klass & Wilson, supra note 31, at 1803 (critiquing the ineffective nature of 
traditional electric transmission line siting laws); Klass, The Electric Grid at a Crossroads, supra 
note 31, at 1901 (arguing that “it no longer makes sense for states to be wholly responsible for 
reviewing and approving long-distance, interstate transmission lines” and proposing “a regional 
approach for siting interstate electric transmission lines”); Klass, Takings and Transmission, 
supra note 31, at 1154 (arguing that state eminent domain laws governing electric transmission 
lines reflect their policy goals for expansion of renewable energy use);  Joel F. Zipp, Amending the 
Federal Power Act: A Key Step Toward an “Energy Security and Supply Act of 2009” for the New 
Administration, 21 ELECTRICITY J. 6, 6–7 (2008) (proposing federal legislation that would transfer 
siting and eminent domain authority over interstate electric transmission lines from the states to 
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission); cf. Rossi, supra note 31, at 1018: 
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such significant impediments to renewable developments is that 
renewable-rich regions tend to be located outside of cities. But wind and 
solar developments need to be able to build transmission lines in order 
to transport electricity from wind- and solar-rich regions to population-
dense areas that will consume the electricity they produce.168  
The permitting requirements for these certificates are 
problematic for two reasons. The first is that regulators—not price 
signals—determine when it is “appropriate and necessary” to construct 
new transmission lines. This means that in some markets, a solar 
development that has secured long-term contracts to fund its operations 
and provide low-cost electricity to a region can be prohibited from 
entering the market if regulators disagree with the developer’s 
assessment of future demand or determine that the state has no need 
for these assets. The second problem with many certificate of public 
convenience and necessity laws is that they stifle competition by 
explicitly protecting incumbent transmission line owners. Clean Line 
Energy, for example, could not connect to the grid because Arkansas’s 
transmission siting laws stipulate that only incumbent utilities can 
build new transmission lines.  
Note that this Section does not argue that regulators should play 
no role in siting—and even encouraging—new transmission projects. 
Often, new transmission lines are built because a regulator or grid 
operator determines that there is a need for new transmission capacity 
and solicits proposals to do so. This Section simply argues that these 
requests for proposals should not be limited to incumbents, and that a 
merchant power producer that is willing to pay to construct 
transmission lines that will connect its generation facilities to the grid 
should be able to do so regardless of whether a regulatory body agrees 
with the developer’s financial assessment of a region’s future demand 
for electricity. 
As discussed in Section III.B, the siting laws that obstruct clean 
energy developments were generally drafted at the height of the era 
 
[B]ecause existing state laws ignore the more difficult issues of how the costs and 
benefits of transmission are balanced in the interstate market, and how new 
transmission will be paid for, siting jurisdiction alone will not remove barriers to 
transmission infrastructure and may present some hidden problems of its own. 
 168. See GRETCHEN BAKKE, THE GRID: THE FRAYING WIRES BETWEEN AMERICANS AND OUR 
ENERGY FUTURE xvii (2016): 
Wind farms go up where it is windy. And places like Wyoming or Iowa or West Texas 
have a lot of strong wind on constant offer. What they don’t have are many people to 
use this power or very good long-distance power lines to carry it to more promising 
markets. The grid was never built to be robust in the midst of wastelands. But these 
empty, often uninhabitable places tend to be where wind and solar power are most 
effectively produced. 
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when regulators had economic and legal reasons to protect incumbent 
utilities from competition.169 While regulators have abandoned the 
economic and legal theories that supported laws mandating that the 
energy companies receive certificates of public convenience and 
necessity before entering a new market, the continued requirement for 
these certificates creates Kafkaesque bureaucratic imbroglios that 
prevent companies—especially clean energy companies—from 
competing with incumbent utilities. 
C. The Zombie Filed Rate Doctrine 
The filed rate doctrine is another example of a zombie energy 
law. The filed rate doctrine is a judicially created exception to a variety 
of state laws that attaches when plaintiffs challenge the validity of rates 
or terms that have been approved by a federal regulatory body.170 
Courts have described utility tariffs as firm-specific regulations that 
lock in place utility rates and services.171 As discussed in Section III.C, 
once a utility files a tariff, it cannot change the terms and services it 
offers to its customers without receiving approval from its public service 
commission.172 
The filed rate doctrine might have been a sensible rule when 
generators were regulated as public utilities. It is difficult to imagine 
how a plaintiff could have brought an antitrust case in court when 
utilities had a legal right to a monopoly and when regulators 
determined what prices were reasonable. The problem with the filed 
rate doctrine today is that many generators no longer actually file rates 
with public service commissioners.173  
Energy markets look radically different than they did a century 
ago. Much of the country’s generation is now compensated through 
 
 169. See Jones, supra note 12, at 444–59.  
 170. See Keogh v. Chi. & Nw. Ry. Co., 260 U.S. 156, 162 (1922) (“A rate is not necessarily 
illegal because it is the result of a conspiracy in restraint of trade in violation of the Anti-Trust 
Act.”). 
 171. See Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 476 U.S. 409, 415–17 (1986). 
 172. See id. at 413–14 (“[T]he ICC requires motor carriers to file tariffs containing all their 
rates, to make the tariffs available for public inspection, and to give advance notice of any changes 
in the filed rates.”). 
 173. See Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 768 
(2016):  
Decades ago, state or local utilities controlled their own power plants, transmission 
lines, and delivery systems, operating as vertically integrated monopolies in confined 
geographic areas. That is no longer so. Independent power plants now abound, and 
almost all electricity flows not through “the local power networks of the past,” but 
instead through an interconnected “grid” of near-nationwide scope. 
(quoting New York v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 535 U.S. 1, 7 (2002)). 
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competitive procurements, and, as of 2018, thirty-six percent of all 
generation is produced by independent power producers that are 
unaffiliated with investor-owned utilities.174 In the mid-1950s, the 
Supreme Court announced that it would assume that rates that had 
been negotiated at arm’s length were just and reasonable.175 Thus, in 
most of the country, private ordering—not formal ratemaking 
proceedings—now determines the profits generators make when they 
sell electricity.176  
There is therefore no need for regulators to worry that antitrust 
suits will prevent the public service commissions from realizing their 
mandate to prevent discriminatory rates, because regulators in these 
parts of the country no longer rely on ratemaking proceedings to ensure 
that rates are just and reasonable. In fact, FERC now presumes that 
freely negotiated contracts are just and reasonable.177 When FERC and 
state energy regulators presume, without reviewing contracts in a 
ratemaking proceeding, that all freely negotiated contracts are just and 
reasonable, they do not have an opportunity to assess whether a 
contract has anticompetitive effects.  
Yet the application of the filed rate doctrine to competitive 
energy markets means that market participants are largely shielded 
from the laws that mitigate anticompetitive behavior in ordinary 
markets. In 1986, the Supreme Court affirmed the filed rated doctrine 
on stare decisis grounds, and it did so despite recognizing that the 
doctrine no longer served its original purpose.178 Without authority to 
enforce antitrust laws, consumers have to trust that regulators will 
prevent collusive behavior and monopolistic pricing. 
And regulators have failed to prevent market power abuses in 
electricity markets. Consider the 2000–2001 California energy crisis. At 
the turn of the twenty-first century, large generators began to 
strategically refuse to sell electricity until prices rose to astronomical 
levels.179 Companies such as Enron would purposefully export 
electricity that was needed in the state to neighboring states such as 
 
 174. See Table 3.1A, Net Generation by Electricity Energy Source (All Sectors), 2008–2018, 
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/electricity/annual/html/epa_03_01_a.html (last visited 
May 7, 2020) [https://perma.cc/YC66-4LU9] (demonstrating the quantity of various energy sources 
generated between 2008 and 2018 by sector). 
 175. See United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Serv. Corp., 350 U.S. 332, 381 (1956); Fed. 
Power Comm’n v. Sierra Pac. Power Co., 350 U.S. 348, 355 (1956). 
 176. See Macey & Salovaara, supra note 122 (manuscript at 18). 
 177. See United Gas Pipe Line Co., 350 U.S. at 381; Sierra Pac. Power Co., 350 U.S. at 355. 
 178. See Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 476 U.S. 409, 423–24 (1986); 
see also McCray v. Fid. Nat’l Title Ins. Co., 682 F.3d 229, 238 (3d Cir. 2012).  
 179. See Puller, supra note 3, at 75; Wolak, supra note 3, at 430. 
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Nevada in order to drive up California electricity prices.180 Pacific Gas 
and Electric (“PG&E”), one of the two California companies that 
purchased electricity from generators to sell to consumers, was forced 
into bankruptcy when it found itself unable to afford electricity it was 
required to supply to Californians.181 This type of behavior contributed 
to market inefficiencies worth an estimated $12 billion.182 Suppliers’ 
anticompetitive behavior was one of the reasons wholesale prices 
increased so dramatically and was thus one of the reasons California 
had to implement rolling blackouts.183  
Other states have experienced similar abuses. Texas found itself 
in the same position in 2005, when market manipulation cost Texans 
more than $70 million.184 In the summer of 2006, New York market 
manipulation cost New Yorkers approximately $150 million.185 Studies 
of energy prices have demonstrated that market manipulation is an 
ongoing problem and that the tools FERC uses to deter manipulation 
are ill-equipped to prevent the types of abuses that pervade energy 
markets.186  
It arguably made sense to funnel antitrust suits against 
regulated monopolies through the federal regulator charged with 
overseeing those monopolies. That is because judicial enforcement may 
undermine a market’s entire rate structure and lead to discriminatory 
rates. On top of that, a company that enjoys a legal right to a monopoly 
is by definition permitted to engage in some conduct that would 
 
 180. See CAISO, ANALYSIS OF TRADING AND SCHEDULING STRATEGIES DESCRIBED IN ENRON 
MEMOS  5 (2002), http://www.caiso.com/Documents/Analysis-TradingandSchedulingStrategies 
DescribedinEnronMemosDMA1O_402_.pdf [https://perma.cc/XJ6J-UU9H]. 
 181. Cf. PAUL W. MACAVOY, THE UNSUSTAINABLE COSTS OF PARTIAL DEREGULATION 70 (2007), 
(“[E]scalating prices in wholesale markets could not be passed on to its customers because the 
statute had required that retail prices be frozen during transition.”). Market manipulation was 
only one reason California energy prices increased in this period. See id. at 69–93. 
 182. James L. Sweeney, California Electricity Restructuring, The Crisis, and Its Aftermath, in 
ELECTRICITY MARKET REFORM: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 319, 371 (Fereidoon P. Sioshansi 
& Wolfgang Pfaffenberger eds., 2006). 
 183. See id. at 353. 
 184. See POTOMAC ECONOMICS, LTD., INVESTIGATION OF THE WHOLESALE MARKET ACTIVITIES 
OF TXU FROM JUNE 1 TO SEPTEMBER 30, 2005, at 53 (2007); Associated Press, State Monitor Finds 
TXU Abused Texas Power Market, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 13, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2007/03/13/business/13TXU.html [https://perma.cc/HK9M-FSEJ]. 
 185. See Did Electricity Market Manipulation Cost New York Consumers $157 Million in the 
Summer of 2006?, N.Y.’S UTIL. PROJECT (Mar. 22, 2007), http://utilityproject.org/2007/03/22/did-
electricity-market-manipulation-cost-new-york-consumers-157-million-in-the-summer-of-2006/ 
[https://perma.cc/PK9Z-GGUZ]. 
 186. See David B. Spence & Robert Prentice, The Transformation of Energy Markets and the 
Problem of Market Power, 53 B.C. L. REV. 131, 132 (2012) (“As energy markets have grown 
increasingly complex and competitive, these traditional approaches have been supplemented and 
partly supplanted by a new approach—one that uses a model of regulation borrowed from 
securities law.”). 
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otherwise constitute an antitrust violation. In such cases, it arguably 
made sense to have the regulator responsible for ensuring that a 
company charge just and reasonable rates also make sure that the 
company is complying with service obligations imposed by state tort, 
contract, and antitrust laws.  
Yet courts continue to apply the filed rate doctrine in 
restructured energy markets. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit, for example, has held that “utility filings with the regulatory 
agency prevail over . . . other claims seeking different rates or terms 
than those reflected in the filings with the agency.”187 According to the 
Ninth Circuit, the doctrine is “a form of deference and preemption, 
which precludes interference with the rate setting authority of an 
administrative agency, like FERC.”188  
As explained in Section III.C, the filed rate doctrine was a 
judicially created doctrine intended to make sure that the judiciary did 
not undermine rates filed in cost-of-service ratemaking proceedings. 
Today, however, FERC has replaced monopoly cost-of-service 
ratemaking with a market-based approach to setting wholesale rates in 
most of the country. The Commission now seeks to ensure “just and 
reasonable” rates “by enhancing competition” among multiple 
wholesale providers of electricity.189 FERC has done so because it has 
concluded that competition is the most effective way “to bring more 
efficient, lower cost power to the Nation’s electricity consumers.”190 To 
achieve that purpose, FERC has endeavored “to break down regulatory 
and economic barriers that hinder a free market in wholesale 
electricity”191 and it has chosen to rely on market forces in competitive 
auctions to fulfill its statutory charge of ensuring “just and reasonable” 
wholesale rates.192 Courts thus seem to reflexively apply the filed rate 
doctrine in restructured markets without recognizing that the doctrine 
has become obsolete in markets where energy regulators do not review 
every energy contract before determining that the contract is just and 
reasonable.193 
 
 187. Town of Norwood v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 217 F.3d 24, 28 (1st Cir. 2000). 
 188. Wah Chang v. Duke Energy Trading & Mktg., LLC, 507 F.3d 1222, 1225 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 189. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n., 136 S. Ct. 760, 768 (2016) 
(quoting Morgan Stanley Capital Grp. Inc. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 554 U.S. 527, 536 (2008)). 
 190. See Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory 
Transmission Services by Public Utilities, Order No. 888, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540, 21,541 (May 10, 
1996). 
 191. Morgan Stanley Capital, 554 U.S. at 536. 
 192. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n., 136 S. Ct. at 768 (quoting Morgan Stanley Capital, 554 U.S. 
at 536). 
 193. See Breiding v. Eversource Energy, 939 F.3d 47, 52 (1st Cir. 2019) (“Importantly, the 
doctrine prohibits antitrust challenges to agency-approved tariffs even in energy markets in which 
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Restructured energy markets are intended to create the same 
incentives as ordinary markets. To that end, exempting energy 
companies from judicial enforcement of ordinary tort, contract, and 
antitrust claims gives energy companies an exceptional privilege. In the 
cases described in this Section, the filed rate doctrine prevented civil 
plaintiffs from enforcing antitrust laws.194 In this way, a doctrine that 
was originally meant to protect consumers by ensuring utilities treat 
all customers fairly has become a weapon that generators yield to 
exploit their market power. 
Antitrust laws are supposed to protect competitive markets by 
preventing monopolists from restricting supply, raising prices, and 
redistributing surplus from consumers to suppliers.195 As this Section 
has shown, energy markets clearly remain vulnerable to market power 
abuses. While it may have made sense to shield companies from 
antitrust suits when firms were shielded from competitive markets, 
there is no reason to continue to do so once regulators embrace market 
principles. In such circumstances, the laws meant to deter 
anticompetitive behavior should apply. 
V. “JUST AND REASONABLE” RATES IN  
COMPETITIVE ENERGY MARKETS 
The previous Part explained how three energy laws that 
emerged to protect consumers in the era of rate-regulated public 
utilities are now distorting energy markets and blocking renewable 
developments. This Part argues that these laws no longer make sense 
and should be abandoned. Overturning the filed rate doctrine should be 
a straightforward affair. Courts created the doctrine, and it is in their 
power to destroy it now that it is being applied to markets that bear no 
resemblance to the regulatory apparatus it was designed for.  
Preventing vertically integrated utilities from using ratemaking 
proceedings to recoup the losses their generation assets incur in energy 
markets should also be fairly uncontroversial. FERC has a statutory 
mandate to ensure that wholesale rates are “just and reasonable” and 
not “unduly discriminatory.”196 Vertically integrated utilities are 
 
FERC has eschewed traditional ratemaking.”); Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 v. Dynegy Power Mktg., Inc., 
384 F.3d 756, 761 (9th Cir. 2004) (extending the filed rate doctrine to allegedly anticompetitive 
behavior committed in a restructured energy market). 
 194. See Breiding, 939 F.3d at 52; Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 384 F.3d at 761; Rossi, supra note 11, 
at 1591–93. 
 195. See Louis Kaplow, On the Relevance of Market Power, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1303, 1308 
(2017). 
 196. 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a) (2012): 
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contravening this mandate to the extent that they take advantage of 
state ratemaking proceedings to ensure that their generation facilities 
continue to be dispatched and remain profitable even though the 
facilities would not be profitable if their revenues were derived entirely 
from the competitive wholesale markets. While FERC cannot prohibit 
state public utility commissions from allowing generators to recover 
generation costs in state ratemaking proceedings, it could bar such 
generators from participating in wholesale auctions. That would create 
a strong incentive for states to limit rate recovery to transmission 
assets. 
The illegality of restrictive certificates of public convenience and 
necessity is more speculative. While FERC has authority over 
wholesale energy rates, states generally have authority over 
transmission line siting.197 FERC cannot prevent states from pursuing 
valid policies through transmission siting laws, but the practices may 
be preempted by the FPA to the extent that they interfere with the 
Commission’s exclusive jurisdiction over the “transmission of electric 
energy in interstate commerce” and over “all facilities for such 
transmission or sale of electric energy.”198 The bar for conflict 
preemption in the FPA is very high, but generators that find themselves 
completely barred from wholesale markets might have a plausible 
preemption claim if they can show that a state is using its siting 
 
All rates and charges made, demanded, or received by any public utility for or in 
connection with the transmission or sale of electric energy subject to the jurisdiction of 
the Commission, and all rules and regulations affecting or pertaining to such rates or 
charges shall be just and reasonable, and any such rate or charge that is not just and 
reasonable is hereby declared to be unlawful;  
16 U.S.C. § 824e(a) (2012): 
Whenever the Commission, after a hearing held upon its own motion or upon complaint, 
shall find that any rate, charge, or classification, demanded, observed, charged, or 
collected by any public utility for any transmission or sale subject to the jurisdiction of 
the Commission, or that any rule, regulation, practice, or contract affecting such rate, 
charge, or classification is unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory or preferential, 
the Commission shall determine the just and reasonable rate, charge, classification, 
rule, regulation, practice, or contract to be thereafter observed and in force, and shall 
fix the same by order. 
 197. See 16 U.S.C. § 824(a)–(b) (2012); ADAM VAUGHN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40657, THE 
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT’S ROLE IN ELECTRIC TRANSMISSION FACILITY SITING 2 (2010): 
The Federal Power Act (FPA), first enacted in 1920 as the Federal Water Power Act 
and amended to include interstate electricity transmission in 1935, granted the Federal 
Power Commission jurisdiction over wholesale electric power transactions and the 
interstate transmission of electric power. The states, for the most part, retained 
jurisdiction over the siting of generation and transmission facilities as well as the 
pricing of most retail electric power transactions. 
 198. 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1). 
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authority to target wholesale auctions.199 In any event, Congress should 
amend the FPA to give FERC authority to site transmission facilities. 
Thus, while all three of the zombie energy laws described in the 
previous Part should be abandoned, the abandonment would have to 
take different forms. The judiciary could likely end the filed rate 
doctrine. FERC could disincentivize the practice of using state 
ratemaking proceedings to circumvent competitive wholesale markets; 
though if FERC fails to act, Congress, state legislatures, and state 
public service commissions should also step in to eliminate this practice. 
And while courts may be able to ameliorate some of the problems 
associated with certificates of public convenience and necessity, 
legislative solutions are likely necessary to facilitate transmission line 
siting. Nonetheless, the FPA should render, or at least raise questions 
about, the legality of zombie energy laws in restructured energy 
markets. 
A. Ratemaking Should Not Circumvent  
Competitive Wholesale Markets 
FERC and the courts have construed the FPA’s mandate that 
FERC maintain “just and reasonable” rates to mean that the 
Commission should make sure that Americans receive low cost and 
reliable electricity.  
The FPA gives FERC authority to regulate “the sale of electric 
energy at wholesale in interstate commerce.”200 The FPA further 
mandates that FERC “shall” preempt “any rule, regulation, practice, or 
contract affecting” a rate within the Commission’s jurisdiction that “is 
unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory or preferential.”201 State 
programs are preempted when they have the effect of “adjusting an 
interstate wholesale rate.”202 Thus, while states retain authority to 
regulate generation facilities and retail electric rates, they cannot alter 
or “set” wholesale rates.203  
Yet that is precisely what seems to be happening in state 
ratemaking proceedings that allow generators to operate when it would 
be uneconomic for them to do so if their revenues derived entirely from 
wholesale energy markets. When ratemaking proceedings and fuel 
 
 199.  See Matthew R. Christiansen & Joshua C. Macey, Long Live the Federal Power Act’s 
Bright Line, 134 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 35–41) (on file with author). 
 200. 16 U.S.C § 824(b)(1).  
 201. 16 U.S.C. § 824e(a). 
 202. Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288, 1297 (2016). 
 203. See id. at 1293. For a more detailed analysis of FPA preemption, see Christiansen & 
Macey, supra note 199, at 35–41. 
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adjustment clauses increase generation revenues without furthering a 
legitimate state interest, they may guarantee an income to generation 
facilities that are owned by vertically integrated utilities. Those 
generators are thus protected from energy market prices because they 
can recover costs elsewhere. Such practices are arguably preempted 
when they “aim at” or functionally “set” FERC-jurisdictional rates. 
That is not to say that states cannot subsidize generation 
facilities or provide additional revenue in ratemaking proceedings. 
States simply have to identify a valid regulatory objective that is subject 
to their jurisdiction.204 If they cannot do so, then the effect of cost 
recovery for generation facilities could be to revise wholesale rates 
whose jurisdiction does not belong to state PSCs. Still, many 
preemption claims would fail since states retain authority to subsidize 
generation facilities so long as the subsidies do not aim at or set 
wholesale rates. 
But while the judiciary may not be able to fix the market 
distortions that arise whenever a rate regulated utility uses ratemaking 
proceedings to subsidize inefficient generation assets, FERC does have 
authority to intervene to protect wholesale markets. While the 
Commission cannot prevent states from subsidizing preferred 
resources, it might be able to prohibit generators that benefit from rate 
regulation from participating in wholesale auctions. These subsidies 
raise electricity prices and do not seem to benefit consumers in any way. 
Because FERC has authority over wholesale auctions, it can protect 
those auctions from practices that distort wholesale market prices. In 
doing so, it would force states to bear the full costs of their decisions to 
retain inefficient generation assets. 
B. Certificates of Public Convenience and Necessity Should Not 
Undermine Competitive Wholesale Markets 
Unlike the strategies that vertically integrated utilities have 
developed to use rate regulation to circumvent competitive wholesale 
markets, the challenges created by certificates of public convenience 
and necessity seem to require a legislative fix. That is because while 
FERC enjoys authority over wholesale energy rates and the 
transmission of electricity in interstate commerce, states retain 
jurisdiction over transmission line siting. An existing, and extensive, 
literature advocates for more federal involvement in transmission line 
siting, and those suggestions would certainly help FERC continue to 
open energy markets to competitive forces. 
 
 204. See Allco Fin. Ltd. v. Klee, 805 F.3d 89, 92 (2d Cir. 2015). 
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In the absence of congressional action, however, FERC may be 
able to reduce some of the barriers to entry created by restrictive 
transmission siting laws by invoking its existing authority. Congress 
has instructed the Commission to preempt “any rule, regulation, 
practice, or contract affecting” a rate within the Commission’s 
jurisdiction that “is unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory or 
preferential.”205 Moreover, FERC has exclusive jurisdiction over the 
“transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce,” over the “sale 
of electric energy at wholesale in interstate commerce,” and over “all 
facilities for such transmission or sale of electric energy.”206 To the 
extent that excessively restrictive state transmission siting laws 
undermine these objectives, it would seem that FERC has authority to 
issue regulations that create an incentive for states to adopt more 
permissive laws and regulations to govern transmission line siting. The 
Commission might, for example, support compensation schemes that 
give more favorable treatment to states that have taken steps to 
facilitate the development of merchant transmission lines. In that way, 
the Commission would put pressure on states to reform their siting 
laws. 
C. The Filed Rate Doctrine Has Outlived Its Purpose 
Stare decisis provides the only justification for the filed rate 
doctrine in restructured energy markets. In fact, when the Supreme 
Court revisited the filed rate doctrine in 1986, it acknowledged that the 
doctrine’s justifications are less compelling in regions that have 
abandoned cost-of-service regulation for electricity sales and essentially 
affirmed the doctrine on stare decisis grounds.207  
Though judges and academics often claim that stare decisis 
creates a strong presumption against overturning past judicial 
decisions,208 not even the strongest proponents of stare decisis would 
 
 205. 16 U.S.C. § 824e(a). 
 206. 16 U.S.C. § 824(b) (2012). 
 207. See Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 476 U.S. 409, 423–24 (1986). 
 208. For academics who have embraced a strong view of stare decisis, see Charles Fried, 
Constitutional Doctrine, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1140, 1142–43 (1994); Deborah Hellman, The 
Importance of Appearing Principled, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 1107, 1120 n.75 (1995) (“To permit overruling 
where the overruling court finds only that the prior court’s decision is wrong is to accord the prior 
decision only persuasive force . . . without according it any weight as precedent.”); and Henry Paul 
Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 723, 756–63 (1988). 
The Supreme Court has also embraced a strong view of stare decisis. See Planned Parenthood v. 
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992) (associating stare decisis with “the very concept of the rule of law 
underlying our . . . Constitution”); cf. Caleb Nelson, Stare Decisis and Demonstrably Erroneous 
Precedents, 87 VA. L. REV. 1, 3 (2006) (arguing that it is possible to “develop a coherent doctrine of 
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save the filed rate doctrine. Even the most militant adherents of stare 
decisis agree that courts should overturn past judicial decisions that 
have proven to be “unworkable.”209 The Supreme Court has said, for 
example, that courts should not affirm prior judicial decisions that have 
been left behind by “the growth of judicial doctrine or further action 
taken by Congress” or that create “a direct obstacle to the realization of 
important objectives embodied in other laws.”210 
The filed rate doctrine passes this high threshold for overturning 
judicial precedents. As discussed in Section IV.C, it creates a “direct 
obstacle to the realization” of FERC’s objective to encourage competitive 
energy markets, and Congressional action that indicates a clear intent 
to further break down barriers to competition in energy markets such 
as the Energy Policy Act qualify as “further actions” that render the 
doctrine obsolete.  
CONCLUSION 
The energy sector in restructured markets looks very different 
than the electric power industry that emerged in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries. In the early twentieth century, most 
energy was provided by vertically integrated monopolies that enjoyed 
exclusive franchises and protection from competition. Their revenues 
came from ratemaking proceedings that guaranteed recovery for costs 
that regulators deemed reasonable. That regulatory design led to a 
number of energy doctrines that courts and policymakers felt were 
necessary to protect the public utility model. 
Today, these doctrines do not seem to serve any socially useful 
purpose. Instead, zombie energy laws provide a financial windfall for 
incumbent fossil fuel generators and often create significant barriers to 
entry for competitive renewable projects. The process of restructuring 
energy markets should go beyond market processes that procure the 
cheapest energy in a given moment. Fully restructured markets would 
also eliminate vestigial energy laws that protect incumbent fossil fuel 
generators from being subject to laws and regulations that would 




stare decisis” that does not include a presumption against overruling “demonstrably erroneous 
precedent”). 
 209. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173–74 (1989).  
 210. Id. at 173. 
